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On The Possibility of Authentic Christian Spirituality in the Post-Critical Age: Abstract 
This project consists of three of my books (plus 2 chapters in another) and a summary 
statement on the topic entitled above. The books are: Being Saved (London, SCM 1985); 
nth Be Not Proud (London, Collins Fount 1989); Reason To Believe (London, Sinclair- 
Stevenson 1995); and the chapters appear in Anderson and Mullen ed; Faking It: The 
entimentali. ine of Society (London, The St Edmundsbury Press 1998). 
In Being Saved I made an extended comparison between the doctrines of traditional 
Christianity and the psychological theory of C. G. Jung, showing how these systems can cross- 
reference and cross-fertilise each other; and concluding that authentic spirituality can be 
enriched by such a comparison, but explicitly not concluding that Christian doctrine can be 
reduced to Jungian terms. 
In Death Be Not Proud I attempted a phenomenological study of the idea and 
experience of death and considered how this may be approached from the point of our 
awareness of the certainty of our own death and from the point of the bereaved. The book 
includes a sympathetic reflection on suicide and an argument for the truth of the doctrine of the 
resurrection to eternal life. 
Reason To Believe is a book of apologetics for the principal doctrines of Christianity as 
found in the Apostles' Creed, an argument for traditional texts in religious education and 
worship and a defence of the institutional church. 
In Faking II evidenced the widespread sentimentality in much contemporary worship 
and religious teaching and I identified this as an example of sentimentality which, religiously 
applied, I identified as inauthentic spirituality. 
The works show a continuity and development of thought supported by a considerable 
project of reading and reflection which can be traced in the notes and bibliography. 
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Introduction 
The three books and the two additional chapters here submitted are an attempt to 
discuss authentic spirituality in the post-critical age and I should like briefly to direct the 
reader's attention to the intellectual origins of the ideas which appear in my work. 
Scripture and the creeds declare that the Word is made flesh, but in the 20' century the 
word has got about that belief in God is passe, that the profession of such belief is, as Rudolf 
Bultmann (1884-1976) said and along with miracles, "Impossible in an age of electric light and 
the wireless"'. Several currents of thought during the last one hundred and fifty years have 
nurtured this presumption of atheism. The rise of historical literary and biblical criticism in such 
as A. Ritschl (1822-1889) 2, F. C. Baur (1792-1860) 3 and D. F. Strauss (1804-1874)4 in the 19th 
century seemed to many to undermine not only the historicity of the Bible but also its spiritual 
trustworthiness: that the one should follow from the other may be construed as an inevitable 
result of the empiricist view of history fostered by the Enlightenment Project. 
Ritschl seemed to reduce the definition of faith to one's willingness to make value 
judgements, and he refused to accept the traditional Catholic teaching that Jesus is the Second 
Person of the Trinity 5. Baur was an Hegelian who based his ideas about the development of 
doctrine in the early church on the notion of conflict 6. Strauss denied the historicity of the 
supernatural events in the gospels and inscribed them to the working of a creative myth. 1-fe 
further criticised Schleiermacher's attempts to identify the Jesus of history with the Christ of 
faith '. 
Of course, historical and theological scepticism had made their appearance much 
earlier than the 19' century. David Hume (1711-1776) wrote, "If we take in our hand any 
volume of divinity or school metaphysics, let us ask, `Does it contain any abstract reasoning 
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concerning quantity or number? ' No. `Does it contain any experimental reasoning concerning 
matter of fact and existence? ' No. Commit it then to the flames, for it can contain nothing but 
sophistry and illusion"'. The extreme empiricism of Hume's philosophy was widely regarded 
as having refuted the classical arguments for the existence of God found in such as Thomas 
Aquinas (1225-1274) 9. And the classical arguments were systematically (and many thought 
decisively) criticised by Kant (1724-1804) in The Critique of Pure Reason 10. Of course, 
religious faith did not entirely evaporate in Britain during the 19" century and there were, in the 
Church of England for instance, even vigorous revival movements led by both Catholic " and 
Evangelical 12 wings. And it has often been pointed out that churchgoing in that era actually 
increased 13. But the spirit of the age was sceptical, agnostic 14 and humanistic, and this 
scepticism ran like a current through the art and culture of the period. Sometimes the pervading 
scepticism seemed to be a matter for regret, as for example in the works of Matthew Arnold 
(1822-1888)15; but other writers accepted the changed Zeitgeist with exuberance. Shelley 
(1792-1822) was a rhapsodic atheist 16 while Swinburne (1837-1909) exuded something like a 
savage enthusiasm for the cause of unbelief ". There were still others, perhaps even more 
interesting subjects, such as George Eliot (1819-1880) who translated Strauss's Leben Jesu and 
rejected the forms of traditional belief but tried to preserve its emotional content as well as its 
practical virtue in for instance The Choir Invisible 18 - written as a reply to Auguste Comte 
(1798-1857) who had asked her to compose a positivist utopia 19. The dominating musician of 
the age was Beethoven (1770-1827) whose symphonic works orchestrate the humanist and 
Romantic aspirations. The Third, The Eroica (1804) was originally composed as homage to 
Napoleon, the great liberator 20. The Sixth, The Pastoral (1809) is a hymn to the natural world 
21. While the Ninth, The Choral (1817) is a celebration of joy in human love'. The 
antireligious spirit of the age achieved its apotheosis, so to speak, in the character and works of 
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Nietzsche (1844-1900) and most explicitly in his astonishing claim that God has died 23. There 
were parallel discoveries in geology, in such as the works of Lyell (1797-1875) who, 
nevertheless, was no materialist ' and in the ' evolutionary theories of Charles Darwin (1809- 
1882), both of which seemed to many to undermine the creation narratives in the Bible 25 26 
The agnostic, sceptical and humanistic temperament was not shared universally, but it must be 
allowed that it was prevalent. Romantics and idealists continued to claim that God and religious 
faith might still command the assent of their contemporaries. Coleridge (1772-1834) had read 
and admired Kant 27 and he satirised the scientists' claim that empirical evidence should be the 
only criterion for beliefs of any sort 28. His near contemporary Kierkegaard (1813-1855) spelt 
out a similar message with relentless irony 29. The greatest English religious apologist of the 19' 
century was John Henry Newman (1801-1890) who had made up his mind early that the 
theological struggle in his lifetime was between dogma and "liberalism" 30. There were other 
defenders of faith 3' 32 but the epoch was all against them 
During the first half of the 20' century the successors of Hume, the Logical Positivists 
of the Vienna Circle 33 claimed that religion is merely irrelevant in a world where all genuinely 
useful explanations are either mathematical or empirical '. The ubiquitous A. J. Ayer (1910- 
1989) declared that all propositions about God are strictly-speaking "meaningless" 35. And the 
refined minds of the Intuitionist philosophers, the Apostles of Bloomsbury led by G. E. Moore 
(1873-1958), offered an account of the scope and purpose of ethics without recourse to 
notions of divine teleology 36. Ayer himself decided that morality is entirely a matter of 
"emotive", subjective preferences 37 
Positivistic and atheistic accounts of human origins and scope prevailed so that by the 
end of the 19th century it seemed to many that the universe and humankind's place in it were 
becoming fully explainable in terms which left no room for the divine Creator. At the beginning 
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of the 20' century even the last refuge of traditional spirituality, the mind wherein might yet 
lurk intimations of immortality, was invaded by psychoanalysis and all human motivation was 
ascribed to the unconscious mind's genius for fantasy and the displacement capacity of libidinal 
energy. In 1927 Freud (1856-1939) described the development of religious faith as only The 
Future ofAn Illusion 38. The inventor of psychoanalysis went so far as to invert the traditional 
doctrine of creation as to suggest that it is man who makes God in man's own image 39 The 
behaviouristic psychology of such as B. F. Skinner (1904-1990) claimed to dispense altogether 
with the need for mental faculties and described human conduct entirely in terms of stimulus 
and response 40. This type of psychology was entertainingly savaged by Arthur Koestler (1905- 
1983) who wrote, "Now that mankind has lost its soul, gone out of its mind and seems about to 
lose all consciousness, what is there left for psychologists to study? Professor Skinner answers, 
`Rats"'41 
The whole enterprise of scientific discovery, taken together with historical criticism, 
though enormously impressive, may itself be criticised for its tendency towards reductionism 
and as an example of what George Eliot derogated as "A lapse from the picture to the 
diagram"42. The various scientific and positivistic explanations explained well enough, but 
when they had done their explaining it seemed to me that they still left a whole dimension of 
human experience untouched; moreover that this dimension was the quintessence of what it 
means to be not merely a biological animal but a human being. The theory of evolution might 
catalogue our biological pedigree, but it is deficient when it comes to accounting for a sense of 
wonder and our capacity for love and loyalty, our appreciation of art, music and literature: 
aspects of our being which seem constitutive of what we mean by "human". And if we are only 
our DNA, then certain philosophical problems (of the sort described by Wittgenstein (1889- 
1951) and the phenomenologists) arise when we try to speak of genes making choices" 
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The behaviouristic reduction of all human life to the rudimentary level of stimulus and 
response makes it impossible to talk about human life at all. Behaviourism describes human 
actions in purely physical terms so, since it will not admit such concepts as will and 
intention, it can speak only of reflexes, stimuli and responses. Human learning becomes a 
process of classical and operant conditioning in which stimuli are said to reinforce responses. 
More recently the scientific psychologists have refined crude Behaviourism in line with the 
development of the new language of computers, and now their vocabulary concerns itself with 
"information theory" and "modified programmes"; but, despite the refinements produced, this 
sort of psychology has not returned to the study of the mind or the soul. 
Scientific psychologists do indeed study something, but this has nothing to do with 
what we ordinarily mean by "human beings", what we call "people". A psychology which does 
not include in its vocabulary such words as "mind", "person" or "soul" cannot logically proceed 
to the use of words such as "should", "jealous", "grateful" or "guilty" or phrases like "My heart 
is in my work" and "He thinks the world of her". But such phrases as these are constitutive of 
what it means to be human, and the use of them is our hallmark: " as 
It seemed to me then that so much in the progress of modem understanding since the 
Enlightenment is dazzling in its technology and innovation, but inadequate and strangely and in 
its discussion of the deepest thoughts and feelings which continue to assail our waking 
consciousness and invade our dreams despite the best efforts of Hume and Darwin, Freud and 
Professor Rudolf Carnap to liberate us from them. In George Eliot's words again: when it 
comes to those things which deeply concern us, we are not willing to lapse from the picture to 
the diagram. Could it really be that the theological teachings which had illuminated the darkness 
for millennia and the spiritual insights which had so resounded in human awareness for all that 
time were now dead and finished - so much primitive superstition from which we have 
been 
-6- 
progressively liberated since the Enlightenment? It did not seem possible to admit this without 
at the same time abandoning most of those teachings and insights - to say nothing of pictures 
and tunes - which describe what it is to be human. But if religious and spiritual consciousness 
were only the future of an illusion, how to proceed? 
These sceptical and agnostic influences were prominent in my own education and there 
was no way of escaping from them into a world of religious calm. I read Karl Barth's (1886- 
1968) Romans and I was moved and inspired by such passages as this: 
"We cannot and need not ask how it is possible from our side to have peace with God, 
that we can be reconciled with God in spite of everything we are and do. In him it became true 
that in spite of ourselves we are reconciled! "a6 
I read Charles Gore (1853-1932) and Lux Mundi 47. And I even read D. R. Davies' On 
To Orthodoxy in the 1960s when to be seen with such a book was to earn the sort of 
disapproval from one's "liberal" associates that once upon a time might have been reserved for 
a schoolboy caught by his housemaster flicking through My Life and Loves "g by Frank Harris 
(1856-193 1). But the spirit of the age operates powerfully, and sometimes it seems all- 
powerfully; and there seemed to be something archaic, something that had been superseded by 
a vital and energetic modernity, about mainstream natural or biblical theology. I had not at that 
time read Eric Mascall (1905- ), so I had not come across the sort of alert criticism of 
theological fashion one finds in his best writing 49. I had read a good deal of Chesterton (1874- 
1936) and his denunciations of mere modernity such as 50. But in my inexperience these works 
too seemed as if they had been, as it were, overtaken by the rush of modern secular thought. I 
was not reading closely enough and consequently I was too much affected and impressed by 
the radical theology of the 1960s than I ought to have been. 
In that same decade the most reductive criticism of religious belief seemed to come not 
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so much from its traditional opponents but from its own scholars and practitioners. The most 
influential book of popular theology in that decade was Honest To God 51 by Bishop J. A. T. 
Robinson (1919-1983) who not only claimed that it is our "image" of God which must go, but 
who seemed to dismiss the possibility of metaphysical theology, and with it the traditional 
understanding of transcendence altogether 52. Robinson's book was only the first wave in what 
became a roaring tide of churchly scepticism, the destructive force of which was revealed by 
both the title and substance of the Bishop's best-selling sequel s3 
Sometimes liberal theologians attempt to explain or excuse books such as Honest To 
God by the claim that they were written only for "popular" consumption. Really this is no 
defence, for, unfortunately words mean what they say, whether their provenance is between 
the covers of a ten volume summa or in the slender pages of a £3.99 paperback. Robinson did 
actually express those trenchant views about our image of God and about the lack of 
possibilities for transcendence in theology - no matter where he expressed them. It soon turned 
out that Robinson, accused by his opponents of being an iconoclast, was actually rather 
conservative when compared to some of his notable contemporaries. Paul Van Buren 
published The Secular Meaning of the Gospel M. Thomas J. J. Altizer (1927- ) seemed to go 
much further than Van Buren 55 and William Hamilton even further than Altizer 56 
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Jung and Christian Doctrine in My Book Being Saved 
Argument and references for the ideas expressed in this section. 
It was then that I came across the work of C. G. Jung (1875-1961). It seemed to me that 
he had found a way of so rooting the Christian theological dogmas in psychological experience 
as to make these dogmas indubitable. I was particularly impressed by Jung's account of what 
he calls "the Shadow" 57 - for him an aspect of the personality with which each one of us is 
directly acquainted. The Shadow, says Jung, is our dark side. It is that part of us which we 
constantly strive to disown, and we do this either by outright denial or by projection: we claim 
that we are not as bad as our critics say we are; or else we habitually find in others precisely 
those faults which are our own besetting sins. How to understand this aspect, the Shadow? 
Jung provided an attractive cross-fertilisation of ideas: on the one hand we experience the 
Shadow as our own inner wickedness, and on the other hand we have an image of him in the 
traditional character of Satan or the Devil. 
The development of the character of the Devil in the western tradition began in the Old 
Testament period where, for example in the Book of Job, Satan is something like God's 
counsel for the prosecution whose task it is to examine Job and find fault in him. The 
character, or as Jung would say, the archetype, of the Devil developed during the New 
Testament period and in the writings of the church fathers and the medieval theologians until as 
Satan he became the very personification of evil. Jung's account of the development of the 
Shadow is stimulating because it connects the world of theological doctrine with the inner 
world of psychological experience. It seemed to make sense psychologically that the character 
of the Devil as the Prince of Darkness would develop as a counterbalance to the historic 
proclamation of Jesus as the one who contained the fullness of the light of the glory of God, 
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the one in whom there was no sin nor any darkness to be found. Jung declared that the need 
for psychological equilibrium demanded that the archetypes of light and darkness should 
develop in this way, and his analysis was illuminatingS'. Theological teachings and inner 
psychological experiences were bound together, or one might say that spirituality and 
psychology were the outside and inside of the same thing. 
The apocalyptic writers of biblical times created the image of the lake of fire and of the 
Devil and all his angels not as caricature figures from some grotesque pantomime but as 
externalisation of their real fears and nightmares. People who were accustomed to facing 
tangible fears such as starvation, plague and conquest would not have been easily frightened by 
pantomime demons. That creature with the fork and the tail was not whom they were afraid of. 
It was the other way round: the pantomime Devil was the popular artistic reproduction which 
they created out of their tangible fears. The medieval Christians were not frightened so much 
by that grotesque external image as by experienced terrors that were inescapable: the 
pantomime image was what they created as a means by which to objectify and so manage their 
fears. Of course there was, as always, a broad conceptual spectrum from the almost tangible 
mythology of the peasant to the refined doctrines of the theologian. 
They also felt the destructive force of their own wickedness, greed, raw ambition and 
lust. They felt this in themselves and they also saw its expression in the world. The fear of 
burning everlastingly was at least partly constructed out of their personal experience of burning 
inwardly with corrupt desires and ambitions. The way Jung relates dogma to psychological 
experience is stimulating and fruitful: we look at a medieval painting of heaven and hell, say, 
and between them the theologised earthly landscape and we thereby learn something of our 
inner psychological states and impulses. Reciprocally, we can find, to use T. S. Eliot's (1888- 
1965) phrase, "an objective correlative" 59 in the painting or the piece of literature for our 
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inward feelings and dispositions. 
Jung's work on religion is a psychological restructuring of Christian symbolism in terms 
of what he refers to as archetypes as he compares the traditional idea of the soul's salvation 
with the psychological pilgrimage towards what he calls individuation 60 or personal wholeness. 
His insights into the problem of evil are exciting, provocative and creative in the sense that they 
encourage the reader to think about the teachings of the faith in new and interesting ways and 
to make links between the external patterns of dogmas and the internal patterns of 
psychological states. Of course, Jung is notoriously heterodox and in an ear'ier age he would 
have been dismissed as heretical in, for instance, his suggestion that God has a "dark side" - 
explicitly that evil as well as good originates in the Godhead: 
"Since the Apocalypse we now know again that God is not only to be loved, but also to 
be feared. He fills us with evil as well as with good, otherwise he would not need to be feared. 
This involves man in a new responsibility. He can no longer wriggle out of it on the plea of 
littleness and nothingness, for the dark God has slipped the atom bomb and chemical weapons 
into his hands and given him the power to empty out the apocalyptic vials of wrath on his 
fellow creatures" 61 
This saying of Jung's, like so many other astonishingly vibrant and evocative passages 
in his work, flirts with exaggeration and is born out of a fundamental misinterpretation. It is 
nonsense to say that only since the Apocalypse, the Book of Revelation at the end of the Bible, 
has man learnt to fear God: the Old Testament Psalms and Proverbs state unequivocally that 
the fear of the Lord is the beginning of wisdom 62 and there are many verses in the Pentateuch 
and the Prophets63 which teach a holy fear of God. Jacob in the desert cries out, "How 
dreadful is this place! "'. And at the burning bush Moses is commanded, "Put off thy shoes 
from off thy feet, for the place whereon thou standest is holy ground" 65. These verses speak of 
God's numinous presence but they do not try to teach us that God should be feared because he 
is evil. God is not evil, but awesome. God is to be feared because he is so much higher than 
man. "I am that I am" - God is God '. The Old Testament is haunted by the awesome 
presence of God. The New Testament and the church fathers would go even further and say 
that God is terrifying in his infinite goodness 67. Moreover, the traditional and orthodox 
teaching of the church, particularly in the writings of St Augustine (354-430) and St Thomas 
Aquinas, is that God is not the origin of evil. Strictly speaking, evil has no being. It is only a 
privatio boni or a µrß ov -a lack of good or a mere nothing 68. 
Jung often protests against the traditional doctrine and in effect asks how anyone could 
doubt the reality of evil in a century which has produced two world wars, Hiroshima and the 
Holocaust. But it seems to me that this protest is based on philosophical or linguistic confusion: 
one would hardly be so foolish as to wish to deny the fact of evil, but its reality. There is some 
logical backing for this distinction not only in Aristotelian discussions of what is meant by 
substance but in the analysis of negation to be found in Wittgenstein's Tractatus Logico 
Philosophicus where it is made plain that no is implied by yes. And yet, insists Wittgenstein, 
negative propositions have no reference 69'0" Practically and ethically this means that as soon 
as good is defined and insisted upon in the Commandment, the character of the alternative evil 
is laid bare. "See I have set before thee this day good and evil (saith the Lord); therefore 
choose good that thou mayest live""'. The act of creation logically guarantees the possibility of 
evil 
Heterodox Jung may be, but he still throws a powerful light on theological categories 
and stimulates the reader to think about religion in a non-reductionist way. If this essay of mine 
is a partial intellectual autobiography - and I am not ashamed to use partial in both its senses - 
then I should like to record the immense feeling of relief and excitement on reading Jung: here 
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was a man of the 20' century who was prepared to discuss theological categories and doctrines 
in a non-reductionist way. 
Having identified the Shadow, Jung digs deeper into the world of psychological 
archetypes and discovers the Anima73, the latent femininity in the masculine unconscious and - 
though he does not give anything like as much attention to this - the Animus, the latent 
masculinity in the feminine unconscious. He has been censured by some feminist critics for 
what they regard as his "sexist" delineation of the human psyche and perhaps there is some 
justice in their case. But when all is said and done, no man (nor even woman) can argue from 
every perspective at once. 
As in the case of the Shadow, so with the Anima Jung identifies a rich network of 
connections in the realms of religious doctrines and psychological contents. The objective 
correlative of the psychological archetype of the Anima is variously the temptress Eve, Circe 
the siren and Das Ewig-Weibliche of Goethe's Faust. In her highest and purest personification 
she is the Blessed Virgin 76 
In Jung's categorisation the stages of the Anima are: child, temptress, wise woman and 
finally woman of supreme virtue. In other words, the Anima grows up. This process for Jung is 
psychological, but for the Christian who finds it useful it is also profoundly moral and spiritual. 
The archetypes of the Anima in the Christian story are the Holy Innocents, Eve the Temptress, 
Holy Eowtia who is ancient wisdom and the consort of God, and finally the Blessed Virgin 
who is Ocot oKos, God-bearer. 
The development of the archetype of the Father God, the Spirit who becomes flesh at 
the Incarnation, is precisely mirrored and balanced by that of the Mother Earth, the mater, the 
material which is spiritualised at the Assumption. The Earth Mother is clothed in the robe of 
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the Sky Father. And Mary's colour is blue. I am grateful for Professor Homan's criticism of 
this reflection. As he pointed out to me in conversation, the colour of the Virgin Mary's attire 
was red until the discovery of lapis lazuli. True, but she has been clothed in blue by painters 
since the middle ages and nine hundred years is a period long enough for the identification of a 
psychological archetype. Facetiously, any woman wearing a dress for nearly a millennium 
might well expect to be recognised in it! She is femininity perfected as Christ is perfect 
masculinity as well as perfect Man (Mensch). Heaven comes down to earth and earth is taken 
up into heaven. Mary is Queen of the Church which is the Bride of Christ. At the Last Day the 
Church ascends to meet her bridegroom, Christ, and the Hinpos faµos - the holy wedding - 
takes place in the courts of heaven ". Psychologically speaking, for Jung, this holy wedding is 
the union of the Ego with the unconscious depths. 
The fundamental archetype in what might be called the Jungian pantheon is the Self 
(Selbst), a psychological aspect not to be confused with the Ego which is merely the conscious 
part of the personality. The Self is the unconscious depth and foundation of the person, that to 
which the Ego ultimately tends and with which this unruly Ego has to forge reconciliation if 
individuation, the wholeness of personality, is to be achieved 78. For Jung, talk of the Self is, 
psychologically speaking, talk about God 79. As in the discussions of the Shadow and the 
Anima, so again in the case of the Self, the comparisons between psychological concepts and 
theological doctrines are creative, exciting and revelatory. Jung's description of the Self as 
depth reminds us of some of the most powerful spiritual motifs in the Old Testament, such as 
the Psalmist's "Out of the deep"80; and comparison with the theology of the New Testament 
recalls and illuminates the relationship between the Father and the Son g'. The reconciliation 
between the Shadow-haunted Ego and the Self which is our depths reminds us of some of the 
best mystical writing in the Christian tradition and particularly of Meister Eckhardt (c 1260- 
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1327)82 and St John of the Cross (c1505-1560) 83 
Among modern theologians to exploit creatively the concept of depth is Paul Tillich 
(1886-1965) M. These sorts of connections make for a most productive cross-fertilisation of the 
images and motifs of traditional spirituality. Jung thus presents refreshing insights into 
spirituality, and his work encourages new departures for theological concept-formation. To 
read Jung alongside the great doctrines of Christianity was for me something like the creation 
of a wonderful series of Gestalts: you read Jung and you read the Creed and suddenly you find 
you are in possession of more than your original understanding of either Jung or the Creed; 
strike the anvil of analytical psychology within sight of the anvil of Christian spirituality, and the 
spark flies between them to produce fresh illumination. Of course, a less excitable and more 
knowledgeable student of spirituality than the present writer might say with some justification 
that there is nothing new in this. He might point to St Augustine, for example, or Mother Julian 
(c1342-1413) who possessed many insights into God's femininity 85 and remind us that the 
great spiritual teacher is always and necessarily also a great psychologist. Still, I came across 
Jung's work at a time when so much of what I was reading from the pens of philosophers, 
scientists, historians and even theologians themselves was and and reductionist, and I could not 
help being relieved to discover at least one writer among contemporaries and the recent past 
who was clearly intelligent and imaginative and who yet did not eat every day at the Nothing- 
buttery. 
The most direct way in which to elucidate Jung's method is not merely to discuss him 
but to try to give an example in summary form of his likely approach to a particular 
psychological-spiritual episode. St Matthew's account of Christ's temptations in the wilderness 
provides a good opportunity for this. It opens startlingly: "Then was Jesus led up of the Spirit 
to be tempted of the Devil"". Contemporary religious thought tends towards one of two 
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extreme opinions about the Devil: either that he is an antique fancy (various liberal theologians) 
or that he is the personification of supernatural evil who frequently interferes in the lives of 
saints (sundry revivalists and charismatics). Generally the Bible takes neither view but insists 
instead that the Devil or Satan is an important part of the divine creation 87 
In The Book of Job Satan is "one of the sons of God" and in St Matthew's gospel he is 
an accomplice of the Spirit - for the gospel does not record that Jesus was lured into the 
wilderness by diabolical cunning, nor did he merely wander there aimlessly only to be picked 
off by the wily old snake; but the Son of God was led into confrontation with the Devil by the 
Spirit of God himself "' 
This story concerns the complete integrity of Jesus himself. In psychological terms, the 
event immediately preceding the temptations (his baptism and annunciation in the Jordan) is a 
unifying and integrating sign. Jesus is told who he is and his vocation is dramatically announced 
in the words, "This is my beloved Son, in whom I am well pleased" 89. Jung would point out 
that this is a typical (archetypical) example of the ancient motif according to which countless 
heroes, from Ulysses to Balder, from Tamino to Siegfried, bear witness to a period of severe 
testing which occurs soon after the hero's initial call. Jung would also insist that Jesus the man 
really did suffer temptation and that this means there was a real chance that he might give in 90 
Jung would identify the temptations of Christ as an example of every man's experience of the 
personal, psychological encounter between the Ego and the Shadow - an encounter which is 
absolutely necessary if spiritual development/individuation is to proceed. For Jung, there were 
not two characters involved in the temptations, but two psychological aspects of the one Jesus 
91 
All this is anathema to orthodoxy which sees Jesus not only as sinless but incapable of 
sin. But Jung would insist that real temptation - the encounter between the Ego and the 
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Shadow - is the fate of every man; and so a Jesus who was never in danger of falling from 
grace could not possibly be genuinely human and a pattern for our redemption. 
If, when we look at the story of the temptations, we see Satan, the Shadow, as sharing 
in the divine sonship, we can appreciate all the better his purpose which is to provide 
stimulation and the opportunity for virtue. It is the Devil who asks the questions, who, as it 
were, provides the moral agenda which, through the process of long argument, Jesus subtly 
redirects in favour of goodness. Jesus acknowledges the existence of the Shadow and by 
accommodating its energies and transforming its intention makes it a part of his integrated 
personality. The church, by contrast, has usually rejected this interpretation and so, Jung would 
say, has failed to integrate the Shadow -a failure which has led to an enormous problem in the 
form of a separated, and quite independent personality called the Devil 92 who is supernaturally 
evil and who, thus unintegrated, is free to wreak moral and spiritual destruction until the last 
battle at the end of time when at last he will be cast into the bottomless pit 93 
The corollary of the separated and wholly evil Satan is a cosmic Christ who more 
closely resembles the aloof Gnostic Redeemer than the Suffering Servant' (acquainted with 
grief) or a genuine Son of Man. The psychological parallel of such a Christological 
interpretation points to *s everyman unreconciled, unindividuated and incomplete because he 
has refused to acknowledge and integrate his own dark side. How, asks Jung, can a man, let 
alone a Christ, be a genuine moral agent or possess true self-understanding if he will not 
recognise his Shadow and admit his faults, but who instead projects his faults (casts his 
Shadow) on to others? The invention of the separated character of the Devil is, for Jung, the 
biggest example of projection in the whole epoch and the fatal mistake of Christian orthodoxy. 
Jung's is at any rate an intelligent interpretation of the Christian aeon. 
The Jungian interpretation is however theory-laden, jargon-ridden and eccentric and it 
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easily declines into self-conscious affectation (as did Jung himself in his middle age) and its 
devotees assume some of the undesirable characteristics of a cult dismissive of all alternative 
interpretations. I have attended the Jungian conferences of the Guild of Pastoral Psychology 
and observed a great deal of Shadow-boxing and Anima-hunting in the bars and along the 
corridors at night. Many of these conferences radiated with the same uncritical enthusiasm as 
gatherings of fundamentalist Christians: the evangelical congress, one might say, only without 
the teetotalism. Menopausal Pre-Raphaelites rattling their beads, their long yellow hair dangling 
over the swamp. The practice of Jungian psychology easily degenerates into the sanctimonious 
Me-ism of the New Age in which devotees never cease to be alert to every twitch and twang of 
their psychological innards. Nevertheless, I admired the honesty of Jung himself who at least 
scorned the unexamined Pelagianism of our age, and especially of the liberal theologians and 
the synods with their utopian schemes, and really accepted the fact of evil 95 ' 
When I wrote Being Saved I was writing very much under the Jungian spell, an 
enchantment which has loosened its grip with the passage of time and the unavoidable 
experience of having fresh thoughts. Still, I would insist that there are intimations of spirituality 
in Jung which are richer and more creative than much of what has passed for Christian 
spirituality in the 20' century. Perhaps if I had read Newman more carefully before my 
encounter with Jung I might not have been so beguiled 97 
Or if I had read the sermons of Lancelot Andrewes (c1555-1626) 98 or William Law 
(1686-1761) 99. Why not? I knew they were spiritual geniuses, for I had been told as much by 
T. S. Eliot 10°. But I was as arrogant as I was ignorant and I regarded these luminaries as 
somehow restricted to their historical period. Another fulfilment, one might say, of Rudolf 
Bultmann's bogus prophecy about the impossibility of believing in miracles in the age of 
electric light and the wireless. I desperately needed a contemporary to make sense. 
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What Is Original about Being Saved? 
From the 1950s onwards, and particularly in the numerous Jungian studies by the Guild 
of Pastoral Psychology, Jung's opinions tended to get presented as if they were almost a 
religious faith in themselves, or at least a high-class substitute for faith; in effect a sort of 
modem gnosis. Jungians seemed to believe that an understanding of the religious archetypes - 
Shadow, Anima and Self - removed the necessity for the acceptance of the traditional 
categories of transcendence. It was not necessary to believe in God once one had grasped the 
idea of the archetype of the Self. Moreover, Jung himself, in a reversal of the Kantian dictum, 
might be said to have removed faith in order to make way for knowledge. When, for example, 
he was interviewed in 1960 (the year before he died), Jung was asked, "Do you believe in 
God? " And he replied, "I don't have to believe. I know" 'o` 
Jung's teachings represented a psychologising of religious categories and there were 
many people who felt relieved by this operation of the need to accept the reality of the 
existence of the transcendent God and substituted for it the concept of depth in the human 
psyche. Jung complained relentlessly that he was much misunderstood: he did not mean to 
render religious contents as subjective; on the contrary, he constantly claimed that 
psychological events are really real. But in my view he came close to saying that these events 
are the only spiritual reality. 
Whereas in Being Saved I tried to develop the idea that psychology and religion are, as 
it were, the inside and the outside of the same thing. Using this suspicion as a working 
hypothesis, I compared the Jungian teachings concerning the so called archetypes of the 
collective unconscious with the traditional credal articles of the Christian faith. Certainly, I 
concluded, Jung's thoughts provide a hugely creative and inspirational introduction to the faith, 
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but they do not exhaust its categories or reduce its categories to those of depth psychology - 
even if Jung thought they did exactly that. After the publication of Being Saved I was invited to 
give a lecture at York Minster in which I would summarise the book. I was very careful to say 
that I did not regard Jungian psychology as a substitute for Christian doctrines but, as I have 
repeated here, a scheme which throws light on those doctrines. After the lecture, the Canon 
Chancellor (organiser of the lecture series) said he didn't believe me. He insisted that I had said 
what I had said only to avoid frightening traditional Christians! Not so. Jung's teachings offer 
an illuminated passage towards the articles of faith, but they do not remove either the need for 
faith or the fact of faith. 
My aim, as the title of this summary declares, was and is to discover the possibility of 
authentic spiritual experience in the modern, secular and post-critical age. What is exciting and 
refreshing about Jung is that, by his invention of new set of conceptual images, he makes the 
categories of religious doctrine immediate. One might say that his work is a fulfilment of 
Coleridge's cravings when that poet and apologist said what he said about "evidences". I 
discovered that Jung's scheme of religious psychology cast light on the traditional biblical and 
metaphysical teachings; but far from removing the necessity of these teachings, they quickened 
and deepened the apprehension of them. Much that Jung wrote about the Shadow, for 
example, threw light on the problem of evil; but in Being Saved I rejected the notion that 
acceptance of one's personal dark side removes the need to square up to the objective presence 
of cosmic evil: what the Bible and the tradition of the church refer to as the devil. 
The same can be said, of course, of Jung's teaching about the Anima and the Self as 
related respectively to the Persons of the Blessed Virgin and God himself. This teaching offers 
a productive and exciting cross-fertilisation of ideas: the psychology is rendered more profound 
by its relation to the dogmas of faith; and the dogmas are refreshed by the new psychological 
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insights. Thus I discovered that Jung offers one the possibility of authentic religious experience 
in secular times. 
Being Saved is not only a comparison of Jung and Christian doctrine. Even as, 
encouraged by Altizer and Hamilton, I began to read Nietzsche, I discovered a similarity 
between some of the sayings of Jesus 102 and Nietzsche's "Gay Science" 103. But it was through 
my reading of Jung I learnt that many of Jung's key concepts were derived from earlier 
thinkers. His notion of Ego and Shadow, light and dark within the one personality, were 
gathered from his acquaintance with Goethe (1749-1832) - for this juxtaposition is precisely 
what is involved in Goethe's reworking of the Faust-Mephistopheles motif 104. In much the 
same way, one can trace Jung's famous identification of the need for the masculine and 
feminine aspects to find union not only in the New Testament 'os but in Dante (1265-1321) 106 
107. And again this syrygy is the leitmotif of Goethe's Faust - Faust's spiritual inter-twinedness 
with Gretchen. It is found again in Tristan and Isolde 108 and in scores of love bonds described 
in the literature of the western world since the Middle Ages. I wrote, "In one of Dostoevsky's 
novels, 109 the cold, sceptical Ivan is never accorded the usual familiar name Vanya - the 
reciprocal feminine ending. In another ' lo the anti-hero Raskolnikov finds salvation through the 
love of the woman Sonya. All this is by way of saying that some so- called Jungian ideas do 
not derive exclusively or originally from Jung. But then every idea has a past. 
The second part of Being Saved is some chapters which form an introduction to prayer. 
It is instructive for me to recall that while I was disturbed and even oppressed for long periods 
by what seemed to me to be the destructive negativity of much 1960s theology, I kept on 
saying my prayers and reading about prayer. I began this second section with a chapter 
concerned with the worshipper's adoration of God and I remarked on the usefulness of the 
work of Pierre de Caussade (1675-1751). What I learnt from Jung was that the names or 
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descriptions which people may choose to describe themselves - "believer" or "atheist" - do not 
always alter psychological/spiritual contents which can go deeper than nomenclature. For 
example I drew attention to the fact that Caussade's teaching on self-abandonment is 
something that can be practised with profit by believer and atheist alike. And that Camus' 
(1913-1960) sayings about the need to give up hope "' are not very far from the old 
injunctions to rest in God; for what he means by giving up hope is that we should abandon the 
neurotic habit of living in a nostalgic past or a fanciful future. Indeed, I carne to believe, and 
perhaps even understand, that the deep realities of spiritual experience are affected only 
superficially by one's own self-description whether as "atheist" or "believer". I began to see, 
for example, certain paragraphs in Wittgenstein - passages which are not explicitly and certainly 
not dogmatically theological - as profoundly true evocations of what it means to be spiritual 1z 
That is to say, my reading of Jung and my subsequent attempts to write about possible 
resemblances between his thought and the doctrines of the Christian faith, enabled me to look 
with fresh eyes at some of the traditional spiritual teachings and how these are similar to the 
insights of secular writers. I also found in William James' (1842-1910) distinction between "the 
once born and the twice born" 13 a clearer exposition of the spiritual concepts behind Jung's 
distinction between those who become conscious of the workings of the individuation process 
within themselves and those who do not "4 
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The Practice of Authentic Spirituality as Described in My Book Death Be Not Proud 
Argument and references for the ideas expressed in this section. 
The next book among those I have submitted is embodied in a very direct sense. As a 
parish priest I spent much of my time helping parishioners cope with death and bereavement 
and I had been thinking for a while that I might try to set down some ordered thoughts on these 
subjects, when my own father died of lung cancer. I decided, for a complicated mixture of 
reasons, that I would write the book in his memory and the result was Death Be Not Proud. 
This book certainly contains sustained arguments, but the arguments are not presented, for the 
most part anyhow, as a series of theoretical statements. Chiefly they are rooted in certain actual 
experiences of my own and in other episodes which actually happened, even if they did not 
happen to me directly. The book begins with a chapter on The Fear of Death. It is at the very 
start the recollection of an episode which occurred when I was five years old: 
"As we hurtled round the corner, we met another of our friends. He was sitting on the 
pavement, clutching a dirty handkerchief to his face, wailing at the top of his voice. We 
discovered the coal lorry had run over his dog. All my earlier elation evaporated. The blaze of 
July might have been a January fog. It was the first time that I can recall seeing someone else in 
utter misery. So I became miserable too. The puzzling thing was Why? Michael's Hanson's 
dog had never been my dog. I had not even liked the dog much - Michael Hanson neither, if it 
came to that". 
Death is a spiritual theme par excellence: "The distinguished thing" "s, as Henry James 
(1843-1916) put it; the theme which, along with love according to Goethe, must be part of 
every truly great work of creative writing. Given my Jungian background, I might have begun 
Death Be Not Proud with, "Death is a universal, archetypal experience etc... " But that form of 
expression seemed to me tired out if not half-dead itself Moreover, it was not the sort of 
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language that was ever going to lead anywhere or reveal anything to the writer, let alone to the 
reader. I recalled the thrill I felt when I first read C. H. Sisson's (1914-) words, "No use filling 
books with what you know already"16 And indeed there is a popular view of the writer who 
knows things or who researches topics and then sets down in joined up writing what he has all 
the time known or arduously researched. There is a fine epigram attributed to Wilson Mizner 
(1876-1933) 117 What I was discovering was that, for me anyway, such things as I might ever 
come to know must be gained by osmosis, by reading certainly, the central and basic texts of 
our civilisation over and again, but also by going around with one's ears and eyes open and 
one's antennae set at Maximum Sensitivity. It is painful to be like this all the time and perhaps 
it is connected to what Eliot said about decent writing as something which is produced out of 
chronic anxiety and even unhappiness "g. Taken too far this can lead to romantic excess and 
the creative flush of consumption which has led more than a few to become, with Keats (1795- 
1821) "half in love with easeful death""'. I do not believe one can search for spiritual 
experience or strive for effective writing directly, but that both these things are, as it were, by- 
products of something else: call it sensitivity, alertness, keeping one's eye on the ball -I don't 
know. At any rate, though these things are difficult, they are easier to achieve than to explain! 
One cannot, as Elymas or Simon Magus 120 discovered, make a direct bid for authentic 
spirituality, and to try to do so is to make oneself ridiculous in the way that "Life, liberty and 
the pursuit of happiness" is ridiculous. If there is one thing that guarantees that happiness will 
not be found, that is its pursuit. One's eye must instead be on some specific task. The ball is 
elsewhere. 
I found that the attempt to write a piece of work such as Death Be Not Proud is like 
going into a trance or into contemplation for a few hours each day. You write a sentence - 
usually one born out of some anecdote, quote or lived experience - and the next sentence, and 
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the ones after that, grow organically. It is like writing music: the first few notes both open up 
but also circumscribe what it is possible to write next within the limits of musical form. It is the 
same, I find, when writing anything: it's one damned thing after another. One is mining an 
archive - the large interior library built up over thirty-five years and more of reading, marking, 
learning and digesting books and daily experience. 
So, specifically, that formative experience concerning Michael's dog, how did it lead on 
in the narrative of Death Be Not Proud? Well, what followed it was not, immediately another 
anecdote, but part of a remembered poem which seemed as I was writing to make sense of the 
raw experience I had just described, and so this was the next paragraph set down in the book: 
the backward half-look 
Over the shoulder, towards the primitive terror. 
Now we are come to discover that the moments of agony 
are likewise permanent 
With such permanence as time has. We appreciate this 
better 
In the agony of others nearly experienced, 
Involving ourselves, than in our own '21 
In the agony of Michael Hanson. Precisely. And in the pursuit of the task of writing, in 
the concentrating mood, one is occasionally struck by accidental pertinence. I was groping for 
something about grief and agony, but what I also received was that phrase With such 
permanence as time has. That in a book which was to be about death! Indeed the anvil is 
struck and the spark jumps across, and happy is the writer if it arrives to bring fresh 
illumination. But how? I don't know. Some things, as Wittgenstein said, cannot be explained 
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but only shown " 
Perhaps spirituality is the connections made by the mind and the heart between raw 
experience and the hinterland that one has built up over the years, sometimes more or less 
accidentally, out of scraps of theoretical and historical knowledge, fragments of poems, musical 
extracts, half- remembered bits of conversation, faces, places and the whole flickering, portable 
cinema of memory? Every new experience enters this hinterland of course and reshapes the 
terrain. I sometimes think we do not have a great deal of control when it comes to this 
reshaping. Events just barge in and find their place among all the other accumulated bits and 
pieces. Subscription to doctrines and a moral code - what used to be called a "rule of life" - are 
attempts to order the flux and give it a context; but if one tries to force this ordering then the 
result is artificiality and that lapse from the picture to the diagram, from the spirit that giveth 
life to the letter that killeth 123 
When one tries to write about spirituality and its meaning, then a second order 
spirituality is created - as happens if, instead of absent-mindedly whistling a few notes, one 
writes them down on the stave. Then the tune enters the public realm, the world of shared 
experience and the opportunity for criticism arises. But an experience or an event may be 
described in many different ways and styles and this fact accounts for the notorious problem of 
authenticity. What is an account? What does this experience mean? "We had the experience 
but missed the meaning" 124: Eliot's frustration is understandable. 
When I was a boy, one of my schoolmates was killed when he was run over by the milk 
lorry. The whole school was extremely shocked and grief-stricken. That is what happened. This 
is how I described the events of that day in Death Be Not Proud: 
"One of my school pals had been doing what we were always being told not to do: 
hitching a ride on the back of the lorry as it crossed the schoolyard. He fell off and the truck, 
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reversing, crushed him. The accident had happened before the start of morning school and so, 
as children came through the gate, we saw the tarpaulin covering our friend's body. There was 
the lorry with its half-unladen crates of milk. And there too was our headmistress saying 
nothing but waving us all briskly into school. 
"No one spoke as we hurried through the door. I remember no more about the incident. 
Only that it was a cold, grey day. The tarpaulin and the policeman by the lorry. And our 
headmistress with her handkerchief in one hand, the other hand kept in perpetual motion as she 
rushed us all past the scene". 
Is the second description better than the first, or is it only more flowery? At any rate, 
from that day in 1950 onwards, the experience was there. Every time I recalled it, I added to it 
and the spiritual hinterland was reshaped: but did it only become more cluttered? The question 
of judgement will not go away. Then, once I had written it down, the whole event became 
much more complicated; and more complicated again now that I am writing about what I had 
written. One recalls again William James' distinction between "the once-born" and "the twice- 
born": similarly, there is spirituality and then there is another vein of spirituality which is struck 
when one begins to describe one's experience. 
Sometimes what gets written turns out to look like a bit of a poem - though there was 
no intention to write a poem. But then, as Sisson said, willed verses are not poetry, and all true 
poems arise irresistibly out of "the reluctant deposit on the mind's floor""'. A few pages 
further on in Death Be Not Proud I described how, as schoolboys, we were told of the death of 
King George VI. I will lift the passage off the page and rearrange it so that the words do not 
quite reach the margins: 
"On 6t' February 1952 1 was again in the playground. 
The whistle blew for the end of morning break. 
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A winter day when it barely lightened; 
The sky solid, not grey but yellow 
Over the black castle, Armley jail. 
We stood in silence for a minute or so. 
The King had died in his sleep at Sandringham that day". 
This sort of description seems to add depth to the experience. But does it or is it only 
sentimental, a purple patch? Poetry, as Pound said, may indeed be "language charged with 
meaning to the greatest possible extent" 126, but "poetry needs criticism" `Z', as Donald Davie 
(1922-) has reminded us. Again from Death Be Not Proud and arranged as if for the Blue 
Peter "send us your poem" competition: 
"I turned and called, Goodbye. 
She waved. 
A voice - not a voice you could hear - 
But a voice inside my head 
Abruptly and blandly said, 
"You won't see your grandma again". 
And next morning she was dead". 
There is a traditional form of poetry which expresses and expiates experience and so 
makes it spiritual, and this is liturgy: the tension between life and drama. Until comparatively 
recently in England, great chunks of liturgy were known by heart and so they brought to each 
generation in its grief or rejoicing the consolation or encouragement of our forbears. Now we 
have only the shuffled pack of new liturgies - the comfort of strangers. Traditional texts are 
indispensable to spirituality not because they are "beautiful language" but because they are the 
chosen and proven expression for those events in human life which do not change. There is no 
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such thing as "beautiful language" which is not language with its sleeves rolled up doing a job 
of work. Language without a job to do is only adornment: as Sisson says, "turning aside" 128; as 
Wittgenstein says, "language idling"" The enemies of spiritual expression are sentimentality - 
"pretending to have feelings which one does not in fact have" 130 - and Kitsch. All attempts "to 
summon the spectre of a rose or follow an antique drum" 13' are doomed to spuriousness. 
I began this essay by making a lot of fuss about the notorious difficulties which beset 
anyone who seeks an authentic spirituality in the modem age. But these difficulties can be 
overstated and the fuss be overdone. Every age thinks of itself as modern, and indeed so they 
all are. But the differences between one age and another are greatly outnumbered by the 
similarities. We may develop Cartesian doubt, Humean scepticism, Existential nausea or any 
number of the great varieties of idiosyncratic neurotic diseases, but the real and abiding 
complaint is the human condition. There has always been a form of intellectual, spiritual 
hypochondria which loves to boast about its exquisite difficulties as if these difficulties were 
new - as if, one might say, Job and Hamlet never had a problem. Much is made of the peculiar 
difficulties encountered by anyone trying to talk sense about spiritual things in our secular, 
scientific, post-critical age, and indeed these difficulties are peculiar; but they are only peculiar 
and conditioned by fashion and ideologies that pass in the night. By contrast, the abiding 
spiritual problem is that involved in trying to become reconciled to the human condition. This 
condition does not change despite all the windy talk of our new and sophisticated intellectual 
difficulties. 
Since liturgies, prayers and scriptures are the most enduring exhibits of human 
spirituality, it is these things which describe our human spirituality the most succinctly. I will 
waste no time then, but simply appeal to a few of the sentences which, whatever the peculiar 
sensitivities of the passing series of modernities, will not go away: 
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"In the midst of life we are in death.. . 
He (man) cometh up and is cut down like a 
flower and never continueth in one stay". 132 
"The days of our years are threescore years and ten; and if by reason of strength they 
be fourscore years, yet is their strength labour and sorrow; for it is soon cut off and we fly 
away" 
133 
"For the good that I would I do not: but the evil which I would not, that I do" 134 
"We have left undone those things which we ought to have done, And we have done 
those things which we ought not to have done". 135 
Jung spent his life discovering the so-called archetypes and writing about them, but 
those few phrases are archetypes readily available in the common prayer, and hence common 
speech, of our aeon. They are true spirituality and true psychology for they tell truths about the 
human condition which survive the comings and goings of fashion in philosophical scepticism 
and conspicuous improvements in the standards of plumbing. No one who has lived with the 
most meagre shard of self-reflection can possibly doubt human mortality and the possibility -I 
will resist Schopenhauer's (1788-1860) "inevitability" - of moral failure. 116 
There are other archetypes, less forbidding: 
"Wine that maketh glad the heart of mad". 137 
"There be three things which are too wonderful for me... The way of an eagle in the air; 
the way of a serpent upon a rock; the way of a ship in the midst of the sea; and the way of a 
man with a maid". 'j8 
If, as I believe, the basic scriptural and liturgical texts of our civilisation describe so 
clearly and exactly the problems which define the human condition, then there is a prima facie 
case for thinking that the same repository of texts is not entirely in error when it proposes 
solutions. It would be preposterous to conclude that, having so precisely defined the disease, 
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these sacred texts fail in inspiration when it comes to prescribing the cure. As I put it at the end 
of Death Be Not Proud: 
"The greatest and most reassuring comfort for me is the Bible's psychological and 
spiritual realism. There is no lessening of the mystery, no way of lifting the veil and discovering 
what eternal life and heaven mean. But I find it impossible to doubt that the Bible and the 
Prayer Book - having got everything else right - should somehow falter and fall into 
sentimentality when it comes to the resurrection". In any case, it is a mistake to look only for 
theological explanations: the best theology is not so much an explanation as an immediate 
presentation of the central mystery. The Creed does not explain anything: it symbolises. More, 
it is itself a living symbol. That is what the word "creed" means. 
These formative texts do not stand alone: they are formative and they have 
consequently helped form comparable judgements. This, and not that "beautiful language" 
again, is what is meant by the claim that the Bible and the Prayer Book were at the centre of 
the creation of the English language: the are the religious register in English. It is certainly what 
is meant when we describe these texts as inspired. And the psychological-spiritual insights of 
the English (and wider European scriptural and liturgical tradition) have been enlarged upon in 
the greatest works of our civilisation. There are the works of the great poets such as Dante and 
Donne, of course. And man's estate as described in The Burial of the Dead finds echoes in 
Shakespeare (1564-1616): 
"Man that is born of a woman hath but a short time to live and is full of misery" 139 
"How weary, stale, flat and unprofitable seem to me all the uses of this world". 140 
The sense that life is sometimes painful and experienced as futile is not after all a view 
of things confined to German nihilists of the 19`h century or to Existentialist neurotics of the 
201'. Shakespeare wondered aloud whether life is not all a tale told by an idiot, full of sound 
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and fury, signifying nothing 14'. A modem writer such as Paul Tillich writes movingly of our 
experience of "God's absence" 142. But what is this except the anthropocentric inversion of the 
theocentric Psalmist's complaint, "My God, My God, why has thou forsaken me? " 143 The 
sensation is surely the same in both cases. And the sacred texts speak again and again of doubt, 
sin, guilt and expiation; but these topics pervade the so called secular novels of our age like an 
obsession: Tolstoy (1828-1910), Dostoevsky (1821-1881), Proust (1871-1922), George Eliot 
(1819-1880), Camus (1913-1960), Samuel Beckett (1906-1989) ... 
It is a very long list. 
And the great scriptural and liturgical themes find expression and ingenious 
interpretation in surprising places. Even Freud (1856-1939) himself could not escape the 
Judaeo-Christian archetypes, though he tried to root his theories in the Greek myths. " 
Psychoanalysis declares that human beings are plagued by neuroses and in the grip of 
pathological complexes which can be cured only when their subconscious origin is 
recognised. This is a version in new jargon of the biblical summons to confession and 
repentance summarised in the Prayer Book's injunction about "acknowledging and 
bewailing" 145. The later work of Freud in which he developed his theory about the 
threefold structure of the personality, Ego, Superego and Id ''6 amounts to the 
psychologising or subjectifying of the traditional metaphysical-spiritual view of the 
cosmos as Earth, Heaven and Hell. Marx (1818-1883) may be seen as the last Hebrew 
prophet, perhaps more for the tone of his work than its content. However, as Bertrand 
Russell (1872-1970) once pointed out, Marx's philosophy of history amounts to a 
straightforward demythologisation of classical Christian eschatology: 
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"God = Dialectical Materialism 
The Messiah = Karl Marx 
The Elect = The Proletariat 
The Church = The Communist Party 
The Second Coming = The Revolution 
Hell = Punishment of the Capitalist 
The Millennium = The Communist Commonwealth 
The iconoclastic Nietzsche (1846-1900) would not have been able to say that God is 
dead unless Moses and the prophets had not first said God is alive. 
Spirituality then may be seen as a continuous process of contemplation, reaching across 
the generations and the centuries, in which the main themes and motifs which have shaped our 
culture and civilisation are repeatedly reinterpreted. On this view there is no need for despair or 
for the broken-hearted cry that spirituality is impossible in a secular, scientific age; for, 
whatever the cultural climate, there is always spirituality. What else could there be? The themes 
remain, inescapably present in our libraries, concert halls, art galleries and architecture - even in 
our cathedrals and parish churches. 
What limits might be set, or even ought to be set, to the scope of this contemplative 
process? On this issue, people might usefully, in a picturesque metaphor, be divided into 
"catholics" and "protestants": the "catholics" are those who are prepared to take a broad view, 
even a Baroque view, and allow great latitude when it comes to the legitimacy of any particular 
reinterpretation; while the "protestants" constantly search for the purest spirituality by which 
they usually mean that which seems to them the most faithful to perceived origins. This, albeit 
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rough and ready, distinction can be applied to whole epochs. Thus the Middle Ages, with their 
elaborate and allegorical interpretations of the primitive tradition, might loosely be described as 
"catholic" in this metaphorical sense (as well as Catholic in the ecclesiastical sense); and the 
Reformation, with its insistence on doctrinal formulae and precise lexical definitions as 
"protestant" as well as Protestant. Or else this difference of approach to spirituality and the 
historical process in which it is both embodied and buried might be described as that which 
exists between those who hold to only a very few "pure" ideas and principles and the others for 
whom everything that happens is welcomed as grist to their spiritual-cultural mill: the aloof 
Kantians, as it were, with their noses in the air; and the sociable Hegelians with their noses in 
the trough. 
Of course, "a whole epoch" should not be measured in terms of passing years or 
centuries but with regard to the speed of communications. In Augustine's (354-430) time the 
widespread promulgation of an idea or a doctrine might take a generation; but Luther (1483- 
1546) had the advantage of the printing press and so he could ensure for himself a similar 
hearing within perhaps twelve months; in our day an idea may be broadcast ten times around 
the world before breakfast. And it is this fact, and not some convoluted Hegelian notion of 
action-reaction, which has generated post-modernism as the successor of modernism. The 
sheer speed and universality of communications means that we are being bombarded with new 
(or at least novel) cultural messages. It is a subject of debate whether this is input is enrichment 
or attenuation - or both. 
In an age of instant communications, and under a world system that might be described 
as technological democracy, the pic `n' mix culture of post-modernism is bound to prevail. 
Only a global catastrophe could slow things down. It is not impossible: remember the Flood. 
Or perhaps nowadays we find ourselves on the escalators in a new Tower of Babel? One of the 
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more enduring of Jung's contributions was the reminder that the concept of Apocalypse is not 
redundant. Or, as T. S. Eliot said, 
It is hard for those who live near a police station 
To believe in the triumph of violence. 
Do you think that the Faith has conquered the world 
And that lions no longer need keepers? 
Do you need to be told that whatever has been can still be? 
Do you need to be told that even such modest attainments 
As you can boast in the way of polite society 
Will hardly survive the faith to which they owe their allegiance? "' 
Try as I might, I could not manage to keep my snout out of the trough. Some 
sophisticated people are able to receive their spiritual insights from all quarters and certainly 
there is a trend towards multiculturalism. The Bishop of Ripon, for example, took a whole six 
months sabbatical to study Buddhism and the tales are legion of how since his return he has 
gone about spreading alien enlightenment throughout the Yorkshire Dales. It has been often 
remarked that it is as hard to change one's religion as to change one's language. 1' Some 
manage to pull it off - but then some people are multilingual, and I am not. Of course, it is 
possible, and even likely, that a devotee of one faith will be sensitive to insights which originate 
in another; but what he lacks is the experiential context in which to set these insights. There 
have been more than enough jibes at the practitioners of "Hampstead Buddhism", and indeed 
there is amusement to be gained from the surreal image of all those Yorkshire farmers, for 
whom the Bishop has the cure of souls, meandering among the dry stone walls and musing 
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upon Nirvana. The fact remains that one's religion tends to be tied to particular places and 
specific formative historical events. Those farmers, for instance, will feel that what went on 
between King Charles' men and Oliver Cromwell ten miles away at the 1644 Battle of Marston 
Moor is more significant for them than Guatama's sojourn under the tree; and even that St 
Matthew's account of the Flight into Egypt has greater resonance than the Prophet's flight 
from Mecca to Medina. 
At the beginning of Death Be Not Proud I described the overpowering and strange 
emotions I felt as I saw Michael Hanson weeping for his dead dog. Later, when I had grown 
up, I saw these sorts of feelings presented not only in T. S. Eliot's evocations in The Waste Land 
but evoked revealingly in the work of Rudolf Otto (1869-1937). These sensations arise out of 
an apprehension of what is holy and the original meaning of holiness, as Otto pointed out, is 
"other"149 I also discovered that this strangeness is not easily deflected by humour but, on the 
contrary, can even be intensified by the application of insightful comedy as Tom Stoppard 
(1937- ) showed in his reworking of Hamlet as a comedy: 
Do you ever think of yourself as actually dead, lying in a box with a lid on it? ... 
If I 
asked you straight of - I'm going to stuf you in this box now, would you rather be alive or 
dead? Naturally, you'd prefer to be alive... you could lie there thinking, well at least 1'm not 
dead... 150 
I wanted to show that these deep apprehensions of what is numinous are closely 
connected to problems about the meaning of life itself. I illustrated this point by references to 
various attempts to locate spiritual or existential meaning, first in Camus' views on "the 
Absurd" 15' in which the story of Sisyphus' endless rolling of the stone up the hill itself takes on 
numinous power; then in Heidegger's (1889-1976) notion that Dasein (man) is "thrown" into 
the world where he has to find his "authenticity" 152; and also in Sartre's (1905-1980) 
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characterisation of the experience of life as "nauseous" 1S3 which view is rooted in the old idea 
of "the sickness unto death" ' M. I demonstrated that these numinous sensations of 
purposelessness, though they are usually taken to be the topic of modern, generally atheistic, 
writers, actually have their roots in the Old Testament and in particular in the spirituality of the 
Psalmist: only where modem Existentialists or Absurdists such as Samuel Beckett blame their 
sense of meaninglessness 15S on the alleged non-existence of God, the Psalmist speaks of God's 
absence ". The Psalmist asks, "Why art thou so far from me and the voice of my complaint? " 
's' whereas such as Sartre objectify this sensation in propositional atheism. "' 
I went on to suggest that art, music and literature are ways in which the fact and reality 
of death can be faced and transformed into something living. The process of artistic creation is 
a way of achieving a perspective on death and therefore to some degree of transcending it. 
Beckett described his work as an attempt "To leave a stain on the silence". "9 Eliot dwells on 
the subject of death throughout Four Quartets 160 and it is because (like the Psalmist) he is 
willing to make this journey through the valley of the shadow of death 16' that he is able to 
conclude this his most mature work with an exhilarating celebration of life. 162 
The sublimation of death is Mahler's (1860-1911) life work. He asked, "Why do we 
live? Why do we suffer? Is all this a great horrible jest? We must answer these questions if we 
are to go on living, if we are only to go on dying" 163 And each one of his nine completed 
symphonies includes a funeral march. In each symphony Mahler believed he had found 
answers to his agonised questioning, but each time his conviction faded and he had to begin all 
over again "6. In at least three other of his major works, the theme is death and acceptance 165 
So, I argued, we all need to make some sense of death in order as it were to live with its 
frightening inevitability. 
What is the reason for the extraordinary spiritual and emotional power of Mahler's 
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music? From the 1960s onwards he has become something of a cult figure throughout the 
western world and his symphonies have been recorded and re-recorded by all the leading 
conductors and orchestras of the day. There is what might be described as a spiritual directness 
to his work and I should like to offer some suggestions as to its mechanics and derivation. 
First, the music is extremely tuneful - though see the remark by Arnold Schoenberg in 
my Appendix. One can actually sing or whistle Mahler's tunes. Secondly, it is dramatic, one 
might say with accuracy, melodramatic and it is scored on the grand scale: the Fifth 
Symphony, for example, calls for a doubling of the trumpet parts; also the scoring is for 
unusual instruments such as cowbells (in the last movement of the Second, for example) and a 
block of wood (in the climax to the Sixth). The epic quality of the symphonies and the 
innovative, daring scoring assist the music's power of spiritual penetration. Mahler therefore 
overwhelms the listener: one is either impressed and moved almost beyond measure or (as 
others have been) repelled by the naked emotionality of the music. Adored or despised then, 
but Mahler is rarely ignored. 
But the emotionality is not divorced from intellectual content: here is no world of 
drowsy reverie punctuated by emotional shocks. The music is technically very advanced. For 
example, one device which Mahler uses to great effect is the long-drawn-out dissonant passage. 
All music derives its power from the process of dissonance-consonance. It is the dissonances 
that provide the interest, as it were. But the ear will not tolerate dissonance only. All the great 
composers in the western tradition employ the technique of resolution: that is to say a series of 
dissonances is finally resolved with a consonance; the music seems to come to rest and the 
longing for such resolution is satisfied in the listener. There are similarities between dissonance- 
consonance in music and the sexual act: the longer the tension is maintained, the more intense 
the pleasure; but unresolved tension would be unbearable! Mahler prolongs the tension longer 
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than any other composer in the whole western tradition - longer even than Wagner (Mahler's 
hero) in such as Sieeied Idyll. 
Thirdly, and related to the last point, Mahler's music is highly chromatic. To explain 
briefly: the scale usually sung (the so called tonic-sol-fa) consists mainly of whole tones and 
leaves out most of the semitones. The chromatic scale uses all the semitones: (for a practical 
demonstration, try playing all the notes, black and white, in an ascending octave on the piano 
and you will have played a chromatic scale. The ear recognises chromatic intervals as in need 
of resolution, so a long chromatic passage builds up the emotional tension. Long sequences of 
dissonances occur in the heart-melting Adagio from the Fourth Symphony and in the Adagietto 
of the Fifth which has passed into the popular repertoire through its use by Visconti in the film 
Death In Venice. Mahler nowhere used the long adagio better than in the finale of the Third 
Symphony which he subtitles, "What love tells me" 
Another way to produce a powerful emotional effect is to move from a minor key to a 
major: the minor differs from the major in having its third and sixth notes played a semitone 
flat. It is hard to describe in mere words the effect of moving from minor to major, but it is 
something like coming out of the darkness into the light: thus what may most efficiently be 
produced by this technique is a sense of redemption - after a troubled interlude, things become 
"all right" again. The most profound use of this technique in all Mahler (in my opinion) is the 
opening of the last movement of the Ninth Symphony in D Minor (always a tragic key for 
Mahler, as for Mozart '66. This astonishing finale combines the movement from minor to major 
with an extended chromatic passage, so that the tension is almost unbearable and consequently 
the relief and resolution when it comes is profound. 
By the time Mahler reaches this last movement, he has shifted the key chromatically 
from D minor to D-flat minor and he begins with a slow chromatic descent (played by the 
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strings in unison) which is then resolved on a major chord to begin the long hymn-like 
conclusion. (Many have thought this theme to resemble the famous hymn tune to the words of 
Abide With Ale). 
Kone., e, e 
Music derives its healing, restorative, revelatory power (as do mysticism and Jungian 
psychology) from the transcending of oppositions into a new balance - which, as we have seen, 
Jung refers to as the conniuncrio opposilorum worked out in the Mysterium ('onniun[ionis. In 
this overwhelmingly powerful climax to the Ninth symphony, Mahler employs just about all the 
resolutions it is possible to experience in musical terms: minor to major; unison to harmony; 
dissonance to consonance; chromatic to diatonic. 
Fourthly, Mahler's music is spiritually evocative because it employs what might be 
called a strong narrative line. I don't just mean to refer to the programme notes and "plots" of 
his symphonies which Mahler supplied, but to the shape of the music itself. Again the historical 
background is important for an understanding of this. in the 16Ih century generally western 
music had about it a static quality: in other words it was constructed vertically rather than 
horizontally, contrapuntally rather than melodically. It is the counterpoint of a piece which 
gives it its richness and depth, and its melody which moves it along, makes the listener feel that 
it is going somewhere, that it tells a story. 16 'h century music of such as Thomas Tal Iis (1505- 
1585) and William Byrd (1543-1623) is contrapuntal rather than melodic - for a fine example 
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of this listen to Tallis's superb forty part motet Spem in Alium. 
By the time of Bach (1685-1750) music combines counterpoint and melody in the 
language of the Baroque. Mozart (1756-1791) and Beethoven (1770-1827) were masters of 
counterpoint of course but in first the galant and then the romantic styles these two composers 
rather stressed the melodic aspect: music became a narrative, a tale that is told; it was certainly 
"going somewhere". As the 19' century progressed, music became more and more melodic, 
more and more narrativistic: The Ring by Wagner is the epitome of this style - or it was until 
Mahler came along almost as it were to out-Wagner Wagner. Mahler's music stretches out the 
narrative almost to the point of rupture. In fact in his unfinished Tenth symphony the rupture 
actually occurs and the narrative line disappears under the pressure of intense harmonic forms 
and structures. At the same time, music became more chromatic and less diatonic. This marked 
a violent change and disruption in western music in which the whole notion of key signatures 
was abandoned in favour of the atonal music of Arnold Schoenberg(1874-1951). Interestingly, 
subsequently, there has been something of a return in the work of some important modern 
composers to the contrapuntal style of such as Tallis and Byrd - albeit a return transformed 
through the techniques of first atonalism and then twelve-tone: one thinks of the static, 
meditative character of a thoroughly modem piece, Lux Aeterna by Gyorgy Ligeti (b. 1923). It 
is like listening to Spem in Alium harmonised by Schoenberg. 
It may be productive to speculate on what these changes in musical form and 
expression signify. Perhaps the earlier static sort of music before the 16' century parallelled 
and reflected the static, hierarchical medieval view of earth and heaven, with all the angels, 
powers, principalities, men and God himself in tiers. Well, the music consists of chords piled 
up contrapuntally upon one another. The narrative style developed by Mozart and Beethoven - 
and one is never in doubt that a Beethoven symphony is "going somewhere"! - may be taken to 
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reflect the more dynamic, technologically-driven modern world. It is significant to see that it 
was precisely this narrative-driven and purposeful style which broke down on the eve of the 
First World War and at a time when traditional forms were being radically altered in other 
artistic movements: one thinks of Cubism in Picasso and, a little later, the poetry and prose of 
fragments assembled by such as Eliot in The Waste Land - "These fragments have I shored 
against my ruins" - and James Joyce (1882-1942) in lIlycses (both 1922, incidentally). 
Certainly brokenness, incompleteness, fragmentation and alienation are the hallmarks of the 
modernist crisis in spirituality as well as in art. All these things are contained in Mahler's music, 
while at the same time there is enough in him of what is traditionally melodic and tonal to make 
him sound reassuring. He orchestrates at once alienation and nostalgia, but lie does so largely in 
styles which are familiar. In Mahler the mould, as it were, is cracked in a thousand places but it 
is not quite, or not yet, entirely broken. This is the reason why for many people music "stops" 
with Mahler: he was the last in the great tradition of Viennese composers to write music in 
recognisable keys. After Mahler the deluge. 
Fifthly, the quality of burlesque and parody is prominent in Mahler and that too is a 
feature of modern art. There is of course the spoof Frere Jacques - but as a funeral march in a 
minor key in the third movement of the First symphony. 
There is also the opening of the Fifth in which Mahler skittishly recalls Beethoven's 
Fifth - perhaps the best-known symphony 
in the entire repertoire. You will remember the start 
of the Beethoven: "di-di-di-dah", actually the descending movement of a minor third in the key 
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of C-minor. 
Mahler audaciously upstages Beethoven by setting his own Fifth symphony in C-sharp 
minor -a semitone sharp of Beethoven's. Again he uses the "di-di-di-dah" motif of Beethoven, 
only this time in an ascending minor third. 
Parody and burlesque are part of the fragmentary spirituality of the 20'h century and 
they occur frequently in Mahler's output - together with those other threatening sounds of 
alienation and longing for rest and resolution, and for the discovery of a sense of meaning that 
will persist even in the waste land of the modem experience. 
Death Be Not Proud explores the phenomenology of death, but it is also intended as a 
book of pastoral help. These two aspects are inseparable: indeed, throughout my work I insist 
that theory and practice must go together precisely because we are not as Lady Ottoline Morrel 
said of Bertrand Russell in his dressing gown, all disembodied mind, and human life is not only 
an intellectual adventure; the feelings too must therefore be part of what is being discussed. 
So next I turned to an interpretation of the actual experience of death. What is it like? It 
is like nothing else as William James said 167 . The sense of acceptance which James described 
and which Mahler expressed musically in The Ninth Symphony and I)as Lied von der Erde is a 
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desirable spiritual/psychological state involving what is mystical: 
"Teach us to care and not to care: teach us to sit still" 168. Eliot quoted this in Four Quartets 
and he expressed a similar sentiment in words of his own 169. Here in this discussion of the 
need for acceptance I drew again on my reading of Jung who, in his outline of the process of 
individuation, described the first part of life as a journey outwards and the second part as the 
journey home 170 . 
There is a sort of unreflecting consciousness which is proper for the first half 
of life which is out of place in the second half. Among many who have made this point, 
G. K. Chesterton puts it epigrammatically when he says we should not "stretch the folly of our 
youth to be the shame of age" "`. The experience of death is not just an individual's private 
affair but it is also public and social: "Any man's death diminishes me" 12 expresses very well 
the fact that death is a matter central to the creation of ethics. It follows that how we behave 
towards others will have some influence on how we come to terms with ourselves, including 
our own death. There is a need for self-acceptance and this is related to our acceptance of 
others: to be "in love and charity with your neighbours" 173 for if "the sting of death is sin" 174 
then "charity shall cover the multitude of sins" 15. Moreover, I suggested that death, because it 
is inevitable, is not something to be feared but at the right time welcomed. D. H. Lawrence 
(1885-1930) knew this when he said we must learn to prepare "our little ship of death" 16 
Mahler expressed this in Das Lied. And, of course, both men were repeating something that 
had been affirmed already by St Francis (1181/2-1226) when he wrote of "our sister death" 
Of course, people have to come to terms not only with the inevitability of their own 
death but with the death of close friends and relations. In a chapter on bereavement I suggested 
that the fact of death should feature in the education of children from an early age: they should 
be allowed to accompany adults at the graveside, for instance. The attempt to evade the fact of 
death and to pretend it doesn't really happen generally leads to neurosis - as it must, for it is a 
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false perception. Euphemisms do not serve us well when we come to face either our own death 
or that of others. This is well-expressed in two of the most influential of 20' century novels: 
Evelyn Waugh (1903-1966) brilliantly satirised the euphemistic approach in The Loved One "g 
as Aldous Huxley (1894-1963) did in Brave New World 19. Even modern translations of the 
Bible invent euphemisms for the nastiness which surrounds death18°; and contemporary 
Anglican liturgies practise a similar coy evasiveness '81 
I believe that the Christian Church has not always shown Christian sympathy for the 
person who is driven to suicide which it counts as a mortal sin. And the Jewish scriptures of the 
Old Testament seem similarly to condemn it in at least six separate places 182. The Greeks of 
Plato's time (c428-348BC) were among those for whom suicide was a shameful act 183. In the 
early church suicide was condemned by Lactantius (250-325) '' and vehemently by St 
Augustine (354-430)185. Later it was prescribed that suicides were to be denied Christian burial 
and prayers'". Suicide was defined as a crime in English law until as late as 1961. 
These rules were applied with varying degrees of strictness and a minority of priests and 
ministers has always been prepared to give Christian burial to suicides. The Roman Catholic 
Church now states, "The Church prays for those who have taken their own lives""'. 
Not all civilisations and governments have prohibited suicide however and in any case, 
by the late Middle Ages and the Renaissance when the authority of the Church was more 
strongly disputed, the ethics and psychology of suicide were discussed openly 
in England, 
nowhere more famously than in Hamlet 
188. But Shakespeare makes plain that this is not 
merely an intellectual debate for we are bodies, parts and passions whose concerns are not 
exhausted by but rather "sicklied o'er with the pale cast of thought" 
189. Moreover, Shakespeare 
has a traditional Christian awareness of the connection between death and sin 190 And 
Shakespeare's (or rather Hamlet's) justification of suicide is as modern as Samuel Beckett or 
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Albert Camus: it is of suicide as an escape from the alleged meaninglessness of this world and 
the sorrow which that sense of meaninglessness produces 191. Actual social structures may 
produce a sense of anomie (literally "lawlessness") and the seminal work on this condition is to 
be found in Emil Durkheim (1858-1917): 
"Anomie, therefore, is a regular and specific factor in suicide in our modern societies; 
one of the springs from which the annual contingent springs. So we have here a new type of 
suicide to distinguish from the others. It differs from them in its dependence, not on the way in 
which individuals are attached to society, but on how it regulates them" ''. If the 20' century 
has produced societies in which, as Durkheim claims, social rules tend no longer to govern 
individual conduct, then it has also produced, through technological innovation, according to Al 
Alvarez, "a breakthrough which has made a cheap and relatively painless death democratically 
available to everyone". 193 
After the decline of the authority of religious dogma in the west, the taboo of suicide 
was weakened generally and Voltaire (1694-1778) even treated the issue with some levity: 
"Creech, the commentator on Lucretius, noted on his manuscript, 'N. B. Must hang 
myself when I have finished'. He kept his word. Had he taken on a commentary upon Ovid, he 
would have lived longer"94. Nietzsche (1844-1900) is similarly phlegmatic: 
"The thought of suicide is a great consolation: by means of it one gets successfully 
through many a bad night". 195 
Suicide can also be a religious act, according to Dostoevsky. He gives us the character 
Kirilov who wants to kill himself "because it is his idea" ". But it is Schopenhauer who rails 
most fiercely against the Christian teaching that suicide is morally wrong: 
"The clergy cannot point to a single biblical authority, nor produce a single sound 
philosophical argument; it being made clear that what one wants is reasons and not empty 
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phrases and abuse" '9'. He conveniently ignores those aforementioned half dozen or so acts of 
suicide in the Old Testament which are said to incur God's displeasure. But Schopenhauer 
certainly thinks he himself has discovered a good reason for the prohibition on suicide. 
Paradoxically he says that, far from its being the ultimate act of self- denial, suicide is the 
grandest act of self-assertion - and this assertion, the will, is precisely what is to be repudiated 
according to the Schopenhauerian philosophy: 
"Far from being denial of the will, suicide is a phenomenon of the will's strong 
affirmation. For denial has its essential nature in the fact that the pleasures of life, not its 
sorrows, are shunned" "" 
Other writers agree with Schopenhauer's view of suicide as an act of selfish 
affirmation, as a way of avenging oneself on a heedless world by emotional blackmail: 
"I wish that I was dead. Oh, they'll be sorry then. 
I hate them and I'll kill myself tomorrow... " but the poem ends, 
"The grown up voices still up late, 
Indifferent to his rage as to his fate" '". 
For my own part, I would prefer to be numbered among those clergy and rabbis who 
have historically taken a lenient attitude towards those who end their own lives. I do not believe 
any of us is in a position to know everything that goes on in another person's head, let alone his 
heart. And I concluded even that... 
"... the self-hate and perplexity that leads some of us to suicide is also part of the 
indivisibility which is redemptive suffering". 
The last part of Death Be Not Proud is an attempt to describe how the Christian faith 
enables us to face with confidence the fact of our own mortality. Of course the resurrection 
narratives in the New Testament and the teaching of the church concerning the life of the 
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world to come were the basic source material for this description, but so also were the writings 
of the metaphysical poets on the subject - as exemplified by John Donne (1572-1631): 
"One short sleep past, we wake eternally, 
And death shall be no more; death thou shalt die" 20° 
And I outlined reasons for believing how both an affinity with the world of nature and a 
related feeling for artistic creation can assuage the fear of death and offer a way of 
transcending it. At the end of one of his last works, Mahler (1860-1911) writes, 
"My heart is quiet and awaits its hour. Everywhere the good earth once more greens 
and blossoms into spring. Everywhere. Forever. Distant spaces shine light blue! Forever! 
Forever-Y201 
That is not a propositional argument. It is an ecstasy of acceptance. And the ecstasy 
comes not so much through the words (which, it has to be said, are not the finest poetry ever 
written) but through the music to which they are set. Thus does music enable us entry to a 
world which may be beyond that described by analytical philosophy or even the propositions of 
theology. Schopenhauer certainly thought so: 
" The composer reveals the innermost nature of the world, and expresses the 
profoundest wisdom in a language that his reasoning faculty does not understand" 202. 
Schopenhauer and Mahler were not alone in the prime place they afford to music as 
a generator of meaning. Plato wrote: 
"Music is a moral law. It gives a soul to the universe. It is the essence of order and leads 
to all that is good, just and beautiful, of which it is the invisible, but nevertheless dazzling, 
passionate and eternal form" 
203 
It is of course a strange thing when one employs words to speak of how words can be 
transcended. But it is a stranger thing still to imagine that a practitioner such as Beethoven 
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(1770-1827) was merely deluded into the hyperbolic sense when he wrote: 
"I must despise the world which does not know that music is a higher revelation than 
all wisdom and philosophy"204. 
At any rate it is hard to disregard the opinions of Beethoven concerning the meaning of 
his art just because he was not an analytical philosopher! Well, it was an analytical philosopher 
of rare accomplishment who denigrated the relegation of music to the level of mere 
entertainment: 
"People nowadays think that scientists exist to instruct them, poets, musicians etc to 
give them pleasure. The idea that these have something to teach them - that does not occur to 
them" 205 
I concluded this part of Death Be Not Proud by saying that the move towards meaning 
in art and music is indirect: to portray, say, the crucified Christ in a picture by Velasquez or in 
Bach's St Matthew Passion is a way of insisting that these things have meaning. As 
Wittgenstein says, they have something to teach us even though they are not propositional 
statements. "Some things can only be shown" 
206. Part of the difficulty with this approach 
derives from the fact that the appreciation of what art and music have to teach us is itself an art 
and a skill that has to be learnt, that has to be practised. Anyone of reasonable intelligence and 
who understands a written language ought to be able to follow a philosophical argument - at 
least, as J. L. Austin said in another context, halfway "up the garden path " 207. But to learn to 
look at pictures and to listen to music until these things begin to teach is not something that can 
be achieved in a short time. There has to be a standing under before there can be 
understanding. Wittgenstein again: "Culture is an observances208. But I am convinced there is 
spiritual truth in music and paintings, though this is not propositional truth. 
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The spectre of death as the terrifying Last Enemy has to be balanced by the vision of 
death as the Final Resting Place. The naturalness of death can be made to work for us, 
assuaging our fear so that we might even look forward to it: 
"We thank with brief thanksgiving, whatever gods may be... 
that even the weariest river winds somewhere safe to sea"209 
Such propositional truth as we may possess is itself not uncomplicated. I believe that 
this truth is communicated by religious language and this sort of language is not plainly 
descriptive or referential in a straightforward way. It is the language of spiritual imagination 
hallowed over the centuries by time and use. It is, as Ian Ramsey (1915-72) said, a language 
requiring a particular sort of practised discernment which might be described as "waiting for 
the penny to drop" 210; or as Enoch Powell (1905-1997) said, it is "supercharged language". "' 
The Book of Common Prayer (1662) and the King James Bible (1611) are, as I said, 
the religious register in English. The verses and phrases in these books have infiltrated English 
consciousness and informed English speech for centuries so that even as late as 1999 a trade 
unionist will excoriate his workmate who refuses to join the strike shouting "Judas! " Or a 
schoolteacher might say, "Some fell on stony ground" 212. One of the most remarkable things 
about these books is that they have proved themselves as brilliantly telling descriptions of 
human psychology and of such spirituality as we might have. They tell us we are "miserable 
sinners and there is no health in us" 
213 and even "vile bodies"214. I do not believe that the BCP 
and the AV - having so accurately and unflinchingly described the nature of this life - falters 
into mere sentimentality when it speaks of the life of the world to come. So we can turn with 
confidence and a lively hope to such words as: "Our Lord Jesus Christ who shall change our 
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vile body that it may be like unto his glorious body" 215 
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What Is Original in Death Be Not Proud? 
There is only limited value in the theory of spirituality. Jung expounded a theory of 
psychological contents and in Being Saved I applied this to certain themes in Christian doctrine. 
Because that book is a discussion of religious psychology it cannot remain wholly theoretical: it 
must approach actual thoughts, feelings and dispositions. Still, it is rather more theoretical than 
Death Be Not Proud, a book in which I tried to apply the doctrines of traditional Christianity, 
reinforced by Jungian and other insights, to the practical business of daily living and, of course, 
of dying. 
In chapters on dying, bereavement and the hope for life eternal, I found that the 
traditional Christian teaching concerning these things matches the patterns and moods of 
psychological processes. Indeed, it is the particular language in which these teachings are 
expressed which delineates the shape of our experience. The biblical and credal language are, 
as it were, the syntax of spiritual experience. There is such a discipline as the psychology of 
religion and there have been many outstanding contributors to it. But in Death Be Not Proud I 
discovered that the best, because the most accurate, the deepest and the most durable, 
psychology of religion is not provided by the thoughts of such as Jung (1875-1961), Paul 
Tillich or Martin Buber (1878-1965) - good as they are - but by the biblical and credal 
language itself 
There is a terse authority about these ancient words and their spiritual power is half 
balm, half spell. It is the spirituality of something like rhythm and incantation. There is an 
urtext. When Powell referred to this as a language that is "supercharged" he meant that it is 
peculiarly dense, as for instance in this example 
from The Solemnisation of Matrimony in the 
Book of Common Prayer: "With this ring I thee wed". Six words of one syllable. Nothing 
could be more condensed or distilled. Except perhaps this: "In the midst of life we are in 
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death» 216 
I do not claim of course that this profound and mysterious language should merely be 
applied indiscriminately and thoughtlessly, as if it were magic; or that it should take the form of 
rigid and unimaginative fundamentalism. It needs to be unpacked and provided with a 
commentary to fit particular circumstances. But no commentary, I found, is as good as the 
original texts. This second discovery of the shape and form of a possible spirituality for our age 
then consisted of an informed, intelligent and meditative application of the sacred texts leading 
to the further discovery that religious language is intensely practical. It is about a man of flesh 
and blood "walking", "sowing" "eating and drinking", and supremely contemplating his place in 
the whole scheme of things and the inevitability of his exit from this scheme. In other words, 
good psychology makes for true spirituality and the most pertinent and the truest spirituality is 
expressed in the traditional language. 
This struck me as an original thought in an age which is much given to commentaries, 
jargonistic circumlocution and excessive discursiveness. It is original to see the originality of our 
textual origins. The temptation is to wait eagerly for the next book or theory to come along to 
explain the Bible. And the worse temptation is to the conclusion that the explanation makes the 
original redundant - just as some Jungians imagined that psychology can replace religion 
without remainder. My conclusion did not have meaning for myself alone. I spoke of the 
essence of spirituality as practical. And what I actually found was that the exercise of the 
practical pastoral ministry was the more effective the closer it approached the central texts. 
Those texts, I discovered, are the grammar of the western mind, be it never so secular and 
refinedly modern. 
i was pleased with this discovery, as it seemed to be the case that spirituality is not only 
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possible in the modem age but in some sense necessary, inescapable - because our words are 
what we are and all our words have their sacred origins. 
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The Possibility of Authentic Spirituality as Outlined in Reason To Believe 
In Reason To Believe I continued my exploration of the ways in which authentic 
spirituality is both doctrinally and psychologically based. So it contains brief discussions of 
central doctrines such as the Incarnation and the Resurrection, the sense of sin and guilt and 
our perception of the problem of evil. In a separate chapter it also develops the spiritual and 
psychological aspects of the feminine begun in Being Saved and the phenomenological 
approach to the study of spirituality is deepened and intensified. 
I began with an outline of the so-called problem of evil: why is there so much suffering 
if the world was created by an all-powerful and all-loving God? The sceptical argument is 
lucidly expressed by David Hume "' and only partly answered by Leibnitz (1646-1716) in his 
doctrine that this is "the best of possible worlds" 2" - an idea that was repeatedly savaged by 
Schopenhauer who was appalled by the sheer amount of human suffering and its terrifying 
intensity. Schopenhauer's criticisms of this doctrine run like a leitmotif through Die Welt Als 
Wille Und Vorstellung and elsewhere he uses wit to devastating purpose: 
"If anyone should doubt the preponderance of pain over pleasure in this world, let him 
compare the sensations of an animal eating another animal with the sensations of the animal 
being eaten 
»219 
I argued that the sceptical argument is basically utilitarian but that there are more 
important things in life than trying to weigh how much we suffer - as if the world somehow 
existed for our benefit. But there is more to human existence than the pursuit of happiness. We 
are not merely "Mayfair clotheshorses or patent digesters" as Carlyle (1795-1881) reminded us 
220 
. 
Any sort of world supporting anything that could be likened to human life would be bound 
to contain suffering and evil: for the creation of a good world must involve the possibility of 
evil unless the inhabitants were mere automata or creatures similar to Well's (1866-1946) Flor 
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221 
. 
Evil is the price we pay for being, and being with a certain amount of freedom. In 
consideration of whether we are in fact free, I am convinced by Kant's (1724-1804) arguments 
which begin with: 
"Now I say that every being that cannot act except under the idea of freedom is just for 
that reason in a practical point of view really free... "222 
And continuing the phenomenological train of thought begun in Death Be Not Proud, I 
could not avoid the testimony of the Scriptures which insist that God is not infinitely removed 
from the sufferings of his creatures but personally involved in them. Some of the most moving 
verses in Jewish and Christian Scripture evoke this sublime mystery: "Put my tears in thy 
bottle"223; "Like as a father pitieth his own children, even so is the Lord merciful unto them that 
fear him" 224; "God so loved the world that he gave his only begotten Son" 225 - the God of love 
flowing through the Scriptures like a balm. There can be no life worth living, no life with its 
telos unless it involves suffering. As St Paul puts it: "The whole creation groaneth and 
travaileth in pain together... 
» 226 
In the next chapter I tried to give an outline of prayer in its various forms and began 
with the notion of adoration, the response that is called forth by such words as, `Be still and 
know that am God" 227. What actually calls forth this response is what Rudolf Otto calls 
"numinous" 228 and this quality can be experienced in sudden apprehension of the strange 
otherness of the natural world, for example 
in the frightening cliff which seemed in the 
darkness to follow William Wordsworth (1770-1850) across the lake 229; in Eliot's "fear in a 
handful of dust" 230; or more cheerfully in Gerard Manley Hopkins ecstatic vision in such as: 
"Look at the stars! Look, look up at the skies! 
0 look at all the fire folk sitting in the air! " z; ' 
We find Holy Scriptures supremely evocative of the numinous sense which calls forth 
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the response of adoration, awe and wonder 212 . 
This awed response is the religious attitude sui 
generis. 
In a section on sin and repentance I affirmed that both an acknowledgment of sin, the 
understanding that one has fallen short (hamartia) and that repentance, a change of heart and 
mind (metanoia) is necessary to a true sense of perspective upon oneself. These are not biblical 
precepts alone but can be found reworked in 20`h century psychology, in for instance the works 
of Freud (1856-1939) who insisted on the need for catharsis for the alleviation of crippling 
guilt 233. Again I referred to the way in which creative artists are sometimes able to resolve even 
pathological guilt through the act of creation. For example, the writing of penitential verses 
helped William Cowper(1731-1800) keep guilt-induced madness at bay (for a time): 
"Return, 0 Holy Dove, return 
Sweet messenger of rest: 
I hate the sins that made thee mourn, 
And drove thee from my breast"234 
Even profound philosophical effort in exceptional individuals is inseparable from a 
disposition which for convenience we might refer to as original guilt. Bertrand Russell (1872- 
1970) once asked Wittgenstein (1889-1951), "Are you thinking about logic or your sins? " and 
Wittgenstein replied, "Both! " 235 
I mentioned two sorts of prayer: the intensely disciplined and schematic 2 ;6 and the 
passive almost quietist method of such as J. P. de Caussade 
237. This account of prayer is by no 
means exhaustive and much of the background for my chapter on the subject arises out of 
many years acquaintance with the words of the great masters of prayer - such words, as we 
have seen, which, in C. H. Sisson's (1914-) words, "Form a reluctant deposit on the mind's 
floor" 238: from, for example George Herbert's (1593-1633) assertion that, since orare est 
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labore, self-forgetfulness in work is prayer 239 to Pascal's (1623-1662) contemplative insight to 
the effect that all the troubles in the world arise out of a man's inability to keep quiet in his own 
room 240 and St Augustine's (354-430) in (for him! ) an unusually quietist mood: "Lord, thou 
hast made us for thyself and our hearts are restless till they rest in thee" . 
24 
The following chapters are an introduction to the two central doctrines of the Christian 
faith: the Incarnation and the Resurrection of Christ. The doctrine of the Incarnation was given 
classic expression in that fusion of ideas between the humanistic Antiochene Christological 
doctrine and its transcendentalist Alexandrian counterpart in the 5`h century 242. Because the 
Incarnation is central to Christianity (even the very meaning of Christianity) it has been under 
constant discussion from the earliest times and there has been a huge variety of views and 
emphases. St Thomas Aquinas believed that the Incarnation was contingent on the Fall of Man 
- that the coming of Christ was God's "remedy" 
for man's sin. 24; While Aquinas' near 
contemporary, Duns Scotus (1265-1308) took an opposing view, believing that the Incarnation 
was a free outpouring of God's love towards mankind and could therefore be contingent on no 
other event 244. Luther tended to respond to the doctrine with a subjective emphasis produced 
by the awe-inspiring notion of the eternal God incarnate as a baby in the manger 245 
Later "liberal" theologians, influenced by Kant's strictures on the limitations of 
knowledge, have stressed an immanentist view of Christ, interpreting his divine qualities in 
terms of the best human characteristics. Some expressed this view with extreme sentimentality 
such as, for instance, Ernst Renan (1823-92) 246 and others so reductively that the divine or 
transcendent element disappears altogether 247.. Some self-consciously post-Enlightenment 
Oxford authors in the early 20`' century took an even more extreme immanentist view 248 
So called "Process Theology" offers an alternative to both the immanentist Post- 
Enlightenment and Romantic understanding of the nature of Christ. A. N. Whithead (1861- 
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1947) believed, "Neither God nor the world reaches static completion. Both are in the grip of 
the ultimately metaphysical ground, the creative advance into novelty"249. Process Theology 
was developed in a highly individual style by Teilhard de Chardin (1881-1955) who claimed 
that the creation as a whole is in a continual advance which he referred to as "Christification" - 
a progressively realised eschatology which will find its fulfilment in "The Omega Point", the 
consummation 250. A contributor to the 1960s movement, the so-called "Death of God" school, 
Thomas J. J. Altizer made the remarkable assertion that the meaning of the Incarnation is that 
"The death of God occurred in Jesus Christ". He goes on, under the clear influence of Hegel 
(1770-1831) to describe this process: "The significance of the world negation is ultimately 
positive since it aims at the disclosure of the essential identity of the profane world with the 
sacred totality by overcoming its profanity" 25' 
In the chapter on the Incarnation I suggested that for the Christian the doctrine is the 
raw material of definitive mystery - language scarcely more intelligible than Altizer's! I mean 
by this that the doctrine is definitive and unavoidable for the Christian believer. It is a given out 
of which each generation has to try to make sense. There is a particular sense in this 
appropriate to our time, a time in which through the insights of modernist poets and critics such 
as Eliot and Pound (1885-1972) we come to see that Word and Thing are inseparably bound 
together. We are neither disembodied minds nor inanimate matter. The doctrine of the 
Incarnation at the very least offers some symbolical expression of this fact. 
In a chapter on the Resurrection of Christ, I argued that it is not logical to say that 
because some events do not usually happen they might never happen and I criticised 
particularly the view which says we may not believe in the miracle stories and the Resurrection 
"in an age of electric light and the wireless"; or, as Rudolf Bultmann says, "A corpse cannot 
come back to life or rise from the grave; there are no demons and no magic causality" 252 
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Belief in the resurrection and life after death arose late in the Old Testament period 253 
probably as a moral or theological-teleological answer to the question of why the almighty and 
supremely righteous God allows his chosen people to suffer: he will make sure that justice is 
seen to be done in the life of the world to come. Such a view belongs almost exclusively to the 
later apocalyptic literature, but it makes a rare (and perhaps even unique) appearance in the 
prophets 254; 255 In this belief the Jews at the close of the Old Testament period yet preserved 
their sense of an historical process under the guidance of God 256; 257 
In the New Testament it is Jesus who pioneers the general Resurrection as "The first 
fruits of them that slept" 258 and for the gospel writers and St Paul his Resurrection is the 
cornerstone of the faith 259. Against the criticisms made against him that he regards the 
Resurrection as an impossibility, Bultmann has replied that, on the contrary, it is for him a 
matter of faith 260; and he interprets the New Testament accounts of the Resurrection so as to 
suggest that it was always a matter of faith 261. But it may be asked whether Bultmann does not 
go so far as to make the issue entirely one of Bola fide. The scholar as well as the ordinary man 
might well ask questions about the nature of this event so crucial for faith: something must 
have happened? 262 
When the Resurrection of Christ is described as an act of God, it follows that our 
apprehension of it must be a matter of faith. The problem is to decide what "faith" means here. 
Augustine (354-430) believed that this faith was generated "by the truth of the divine power" 
so that the creation of faith is itself a miraculous act of God 263. In contemporary usage, "faith" 
usually refers to an attitude or disposition which is not based on what can be inferred from 
facts (which might be termed "knowledge") but which goes beyond such inferences. For many 
of the Church Fathers and theologians of the Medieval period however, faith is itself a kind of 
knowledge 264 But for Martin Luther (1483-1546) the faith required to apprehend the action of 
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God in raising Jesus from the dead is the very opposite of the knowledge that is supposed to 
come from reasoning: "Reason is the greatest enemy that faith has: it never comes to the aid of 
spiritual things but struggles against the divine word, treating with contempt all that emanates 
from God" 265. Kant (1724-1804) formalised the opposition of faith and reason 266 and this 
disjunction may be regarded as the origin of the same dichotomy found in the views of 
Existentialists from Kierkegaard (1813-1855) 267 to Bultmann (1884-1976) 
Newman's notion of "cumulating probabilities" 268 represents an attempt at a 
rapprochement between faith and reason. "He insisted that faith must rest on reason, but he 
was no less emphatic that `the faith and reason of which I speak are subjective, personal, 
private and unscientific"' 269. To reason and faith must be added an act of will which for 
Newman is judgement. When we say that Christianity is the religion of the Incarnation, we are 
not speaking only about spirit becoming involved with flesh: incarnation is a philosophical, 
critical and phenomenological way of understanding the fact that truth is bound up with things 
and with images; and that doctrines express truth not in the abstract but in terms of life as it is 
lived. "The image is necessary for the insight" 270. 
Apologetics and the defence of doctrine compel the writer to face the issues of 
education and cultural relativism. The last two chapters in Reason To Believe are an attempt to 
do this. 
I write as one who for four years was Chairman of the Bolton Association for Multicultural 
Education. This work did much to enhance my understanding of different cultural perspectives, 
but in the end these perspectives remain different. "A people without history is not redeemed 
from time" Z". And religion is a matter of soil as well as soul. In my book Reason To Believe, 
the final chapter urges the need for the most profound respect and forbearance among 
members of different denominations and world faiths, but argues that the best way to promote 
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mutual respect and understanding is for each faith community to practise its own religion 
scrupulously. We recall the Old Testament commandments to the Jews - that they should be 
hospitable to the stranger within their gates 172 . And in the New Testament, Christ praised the 
Good Samaritan but he did not tell his listeners to adopt the religion of the Samaritans. Neither 
did he follow his statement about the faithful centurion: "I have not found so great faith - no, 
not in all Israel" 273 with an injunction to his followers to defect to the Cult of Mithras, popular 
among the soldiers in the Roman garrisons. 
The wider ecumenism of the world religions movement, born out of the best intentions, 
quickly dissipates into what is only tenuous. This is bound to happen because ecumenical, 
multifaith statements are necessarily the product of diplomacy and artificially concocted 
concordats; whereas each particular faith community has developed, often painfully, over 
centuries. Such statements also frequently "falsify history and impose the Whig point of 
view"274. As the Chief Rabbi, Jonathan Sacks, said to me in an interview, "The best way to 
learn to love the Arab is by becoming a good Jew" 275 In Reason To Believe I said, 
"Pluralism works, if at all, only where religion is weak. Weaken religion then and 
abolish strife? But where religion is weakened and marginalised, in a fit of self-abnegation, as 
in English Christianity today, what does the nation live by? It will not live by the bland 
outpourings of utilitarianism. It will be taken over either by crass materialism or else some 
violent caricature religion... 
"Pluralism is never suggested by people who feel strongly about religion, by people who 
are actually religious, but by others - academics, bishops and the like who derive their security 
not from the truths of religion but from the liberal-utilitarian consensus which stands back, as it 
were, and regards itself as the one privileged point from which all religions can be observed 
and evaluated. There is no such point in fact". 
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It was partly my experience with the Multicultural Association which led me to try to 
set out the fundamentals of my personal spirituality. I found encouragement in this attempt in 
what seemed the relentless denials of traditional doctrines by those who are paid to uphold 
them. 1993 was the thirtieth anniversary of the secularising theology which appeared in such 
works as Honest To God by Bishop Robinson and The Secular Meaning of the Gospel by Van 
Buren. In the intervening years the demythologising and debunking process had gone much 
further: the Incarnation of Christ was described by John Hick as "a myth" 276, and the 
biblically- based teachings concerning the Virgin Birth and the Resurrection were repeatedly 
disparaged by senior theologians and churchmen as unhistorical - according to an extreme 
empirical view of history. Along with this historical disparagement went the usual Pelagian- 
Whig view which deprecated all talk of Original Sin and so, in my view, fatally misperceived 
human nature and the human condition. 
I tried to apply the meditative, phenomenological method of which I have written earlier 
in this essay. I contemplated the doctrines, motifs and archetypes of faith and tried to make 
sense of them in their own terms. I was not very successful at the time and I would now 
criticise whole stretches of Reason To Believe for being too discursive and theoretical. Whereas 
the knack is so to embody what one writes in image and symbol that the argument takes on the 
appearance of indubitability. There is such a thing after all as a body of work. And incarnation 
is not only a specific doctrine about Jesus Christ, it is the Christian faith's best shot at a theory 
of knowledge - which convinces precisely and paradoxically (one might say crucially) because 
it is not a theory 277 . 
It is instructive to discover that the phenomenological method is 
enthusiastically espoused by those liberal multiculturalists who claim that each world religion 
must be understood in its own terms according to what they describe as "ethnomethodology" 
and that to apply western critical or Christian perspectives in these cases is illegitimate; but that 
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when it comes to the study of classical Christianity, phenomenological and 
ethnomethodological principles are discarded and the faith is judged according to the criteria of 
Enlightement Empiricism and Positivism. 
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What Is Original About Reason To Believe? 
The chapters on education and the possibility of a national church argue that authentic 
spirituality must acknowledge something as basic, as given. Minds must be filled with 
something 278. I believe that it is a mistake to take as fundamental the multiculturalism which is 
widely promoted in educational institutions and in the World Religions movement. For this sort 
of multiculturalism assumes that there is some neutral, abstract position from which the 
individual can assess and evaluate the various religious perspectives. If there were such a 
position, it would itself assume the character of a religion - since, by definition, one's religion is 
what one daily takes most seriously. This is what Simone Weil has called "the experimental 
proof of the existence of God" 279 
But religion, and therefore expressions of spirituality, are cultural, historic and 
institutional. One cannot change one's religion as one changes one's shirt or flit about among 
the various religions, taking a bit of doctrine from here and a bit from there 280. If religion is the 
deepest and most binding activity in which we engage - and if it is not this, then it is a 
blasphemous sham - then we are not allowed to assume the attitude of the dilettante. One 
recalls Spengler's remark about, "The dishonest Buddhism of the drawing rooms" 
281. But to 
learn one's spirituality within a particular religious tradition does not imply hatred for all other 
religions or involve the individual in a 
denial of the truths of other faiths. The practice of one's 
religion is simply that: it is the practice of say Judaism, Hinduism or Christianity; that is to say it 
is one thing and not another. And the best way to cultivate in oneself respect for another's 
tradition is to understand one's own. This principle may be extended to society at large and it is 
a better promoter of both religious 
freedom and racial harmony than the disembodied 
multicultural philosophy of which 
it is the opposite. 
Because there is no neutral perspective it follows that, for authentic spirituality to exist, 
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the individual must affirm, "Here I stand". And he stands within a particular cultural and 
historic religious tradition. Even the atheist stands within such a tradition and it may be said 
without hyperbole that there are, for example, Christian atheists and Jewish atheists. The atheist 
is usually a person whose thinking is in opposition to a particular doctrine of God and not to 
gods in general. At any rate, that is usually how atheism is arrived at. There is no escaping the 
historic reality of tradition. I expressed this epigrammatically: Nietzsche was only able to say, 
"God is dead" 282 because Moses and Aaron had first told the Hebrews that God is alive 283 
In my search for authentic spirituality I am striving to improve my practice of the 
phenomenological procedure and so, in keeping with my stated intention to become less 
theoretically attenuated and more rooted and grounded in the imagery of faith, I will end this 
section with a practical example. This example is practical in two senses: first, it tries to be an 
actual instance of the phenomenological approach, and secondly, it is produced for a real 
occasion, an occasion that could not be more incarnational. It is a Christmas sermon: 
"How we miss Bishop David Jenkins of Durham now he has retired! He used to turn 
up every year a few days before Christmas - regular as Jack the Giant-Killer or Widow 
Twanky. And his clever, sceptical slogan for that year would appear in all the papers; his 
radical soundbite reverberate through the airwaves. To give him credit, David never actually 
said that the Christian faith is meaningless - for that you have to go as far as America and 
Bishop Spong - but he always said that the faith means something other than what it says. So 
David would say that there was - with that compulsory academic qualifier "probably" - no 
Virgin Birth. No wise men attended the manger. And such shepherds as there might have been 
stayed out in the fields with their flocks where, of course, they were serenaded by no angel 
choir - because there "probably" aren't such things as angels. 
I wonder what the real angels 
sang, 
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Hark! the herald angels sing, 
Jenkins is the latest thing. 
The plain man might think that these sorts of sceptical or revisionary statements 
effectively deny the truth of the Christian faith. But radical bishops do not think as we think in 
the street. For such as David Jenkins, the Christmas story is an endless series of shifting 
metaphors for social justice, for care of the environment, or it might be vegetarianism, overseas 
aid and so on. The impression is of a practised dealer at the casino by night. He wears his green 
eyeshade at a rakish angle and the cards come tumbling out of his palms faster than you can 
count the spots on them. 
The question will not go away though: is the Christian faith true? I feel this morning 
like the Irishman who when asked, "How do I get to Tipperary? " replied, "Well, I wouldn't 
start from here! " Asking whether the Christian faith is true or not is like asking if Westminster 
bridge is true. Westminster bridge is there and it is real. And so is the Christian faith. For the 
faith is not an hypothesis or a collected series of philosophical arguments - though of course 
one can legitimately argue philosophically about the Christian faith. But the more 
philosophically-sophisticated you become, the further you remove yourself from the reality of 
the faith. 
The Christian faith is not a theory, it is a story. Next question: "But is it a true story? " I 
wouldn't start from there either. It is a story to which we all belong. It is how things are and 
how they came to be as they are. The Word is made flesh - that is, the story is tangible; it is full 
of things. This church and St Paul's up the road are part of the story. So are all the little village 
churches where they still say Matins from the Prayer Book and sing Wesley's hymns 
accompanied by a volunteer organist. Lights and windows, candles and bells: these are all part 
of the story. So is carols from Kings College. 
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The music of Bach's Christmas Oratorio in which the great man imagines the Nativity 
at Leipzig in the 18" century and wise men with snow on their boots. That is part of the story. 
And so is the ravishing architecture of Baroque churches which themselves look like the music 
of Bach transmuted into wood and stone. Go back further and you will find Anselm is part of 
the story - the wise guy who said, "God could not exist merely by accident, so his existence is 
either impossible or necessary; clearly it is not impossible; therefore it is necessary that God 
exists"284. Or Aquinas who said, "You must conclude either that the universe is no one's idea 
or that it is your own idea - unless you choose the only reasonable explanation that it is God's 
idea" 285. "Pull down thy vanity" 286 
Back and back to the 4 `h century and St Augustine's wonderful prayers such as, "0 
Lord, thou hast made us for thyself and our hearts are restless till they rest in thee". Back to the 
shepherds abiding in the fields. Gold, Frankincense and Myrrh. Back and back to the voice 
crying in the wilderness, to the lion eating straw like the ox, back and back to "every valley 
shall be exalted"287. - and the music of Handel which is inseparably tied to those words. Back 
to the time of our first disobedience and the sensational and spine-chilling bit about the voice of 
God walking in the garden in the cool of the day 288. Back and back. Back and forwards. To 
Magdala now and Capernaum. To the loaves and fishes. To the upper room and "Take, eat. 
This is my body which is given for you" 289. Back and forth to the manger and to Golgotha. 
We are led all that way for birth and death 290. 
We cannot take bits of the faith in isolation and test them for truth. We're not in the 
laboratory business here. We're in the sacred history business. How foolish it would be to try 
to understand the meaning of Bach's Christmas Oratorio by doing a forensic test on five bars 
of it! How wrongheaded it would be to try to see the significance of a masterly painting such as 
The Journey of the Magi by snipping off the bottom left hand corner of it and sticking it under 
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a microscope! 
It is the same with the Christian story. You have to see the whole of it. It is a story with 
a beginning, a middle and an end. Now I have a question for the radicals and sceptics: if you 
really reckon that the Christian faith has got it wrong all these centuries, on the basis of what do 
you propose to put it right? The Christian faith in all its historic continuity and its theological 
plot is our story. That is what I meant when I said at the start that it is the story to which we 
belong. It is the story that tells it like it is with us. And we do not evaluate the story, it is the 
story which judges us. "Show me what you value and I will tell you what you're worth" 29` 
And the story is glorious. Last Monday at our wonderful carol service we were given in 
all those songs and readings a brief outline of the whole story. The most moving part for me of 
a supremely moving occasion was towards the end when I had to walk up to the altar and say 
the Collect. As I walked with 0 Come All Ye Faithful sounding in my ears and with the 
recollection of Harold Darke's In The Bleak Midwinter still hot in my mind, I realised that I 
with all the other people in this building were at that moment uniquely privileged: for we were 
singing the story; and our singing and reading and praying the story was the very latest part of 
the story itself. We had recounted the Christian story and now we were moving it onwards. No 
wonder I almost fell over with terror and joy! Now I begin to understand what "sacrificial 
priesthood" involves! 
That is the comfort in the story - which is true as gospel, not as theory - that we all 
belong to it. It is the story of the babe in the manger and the redemption of the world. Our 
redemption. We belong to a tale that is true. It is the lovely, heartfelt story of our belonging. 
And no one can take it away from us. Not ever. God with us. And the Word was made flesh 
and dwelt among us, and we beheld his glory, the glory as of the only begotten of the Father, 
full of grace and truth... " 292 
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The Outline of Authentic Spirituality in Faking It: The Sentimentalisation of Society and 
What Is Original About It. 
In my chapter in this book I try to identify intellectual and emotional perspectives and 
responses which produce unwholesome, inauthentic spirituality. Authentic spirituality requires 
adherence not just to a particular religious tradition but to the whole of that tradition. The 
selective application of doctrines leads only to a devalued, ersatz and Kitsch mode of religious 
expression and spirituality itself degenerates into sentimentality which is an inauthentic 
emotional response, "pretending to have feelings one does not in fact have" 29;. I believe that I 
have identified several examples of this inauthenticity and the conditions which it produces. 
First, spirituality is inauthentic when it omits or undervalues fundamental doctrines of 
the faith. The Baptism and Burial rites in the Church of England's official new Prayer Book, 
the so called Alternative Service Book are inauthentic in this sense. The Baptismal liturgy omits 
all the 1662 Book of Common Prayer's references to the fact that human beings were 
conceived and born in sin, while the devil and all his works are not so much as mentioned let 
alone renounced. Thus all the promises of redemption and salvation are worthless. What is the 
candidate for baptism being saved from? All mention of real and palpable evils thus removed, 
the Baptismal Rite degenerates into sentimentality - "a prelude to the booze up and the cake. 
And of course the photographs. But photographs that will evidence what? " A similar 
accusation of sentimentality can be made against the Burial Service which squeamishly omits 
the BCP's references to "vile bodies" and to the fact that "worms destroy this body". It is the 
same failing we detected in the Baptism Service, as the failure to mention vile bodies renders 
the promise "that we shall be made like unto his glorious body" vacuous. 
More generally, the omission of central parts of the historic tradition as expressed in 
doctrine and worship is bound to lead to inauthenticity. The new rites of the Church of 
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England and the liturgical practices in many of the so called Charismatic churches represent 
both a dilution and a distortion of teaching which leads to a fake or sentimental spirituality 
constituted chiefly of mere niceness and the desire not to give offence by, for example, 
describing (as the BCP does) human beings as "miserable sinners". But to understate, or in 
some places not to state at all, the fact of sin and of Original Sin renders all the subsequent talk 
of God's forgiveness and mercy valueless. 
I believe the way in which I have identified and described inauthentic spirituality to be 
original. Of course, this identification of inauthentic spirituality y does not complete my task 
throughout these cited works which has been to try to say what authentic spirituality might be; 
but it does give to the whole project a more exhaustive and rounded appearance. 
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Appendix: Article: The Way of Transcendence in Music - 
The Nine Symphonies of Gustav Mahler from Faith and Freedom (1983) 
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Notes 
1. Rudolf Bultmann, `The Case for Demythologising' trans. R. H. Fuller. Hans Werner 
Bartsch, ed. Kerygma & Myth Vol. II (London, SPCK, 1962) p. 183 
2. Albrect Ritschl, Die Christliche Lehre von der Rechtfertigung und Versohnüng (1870) trans. 
J. S. Black, A Critical History of the Christian Doctrine of Justification (Edinburgh, Edinburgh, 
1872). 
3. F. C. Baur, Die Christliche Gnosis (1835) trans. Peter C. Hodgson, The Formation of 
Historical Theology (New York, Harper & Row, 1966) 
4. D. F. Strauss, Leben Jesu (1835) trans. Peter C Hodgson, (London, SCM 1973) 
5. The English theologian Bethune Baker, a Ritschlian added: "I know almost nothing of God's 
character apart from Jesus. " Modem Churchman, (September 1921). 
6. Baur also denied the Pauline authorship of Romans, Corinthians & Galatians, Epistles which 
he placed in 2' century, and he claimed that Matthew is the earliest gospel. John he dismissed 
as of no historical value. 
7. Strauss was enormously influential in the progress of historical criticism in the 19`h century. 
But Nietzsche accused him of making "timid concessions to the taste of the time" and added 
"You have founded the most agreeable religion in the world: a religion whose Founder is 
critically honoured by being laughed at". 
F Nietzsche, Unzeitgemasse Betrachtungen (1873) trans. RJ Hollingdale Untimely 
Meditations, (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1983) p. 16. 
8. D. Hume, An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding (1748) Section XII Pt III, L. A. 
Selby-Bigg, ed.; (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1966) p. 165. 
9. St Thomas Aquinas, `The Five Ways' Summa Theologiae Pte, trans. Timothy 
McDermott (London, Methuen 1989) pp 12-14. 
10. I. Kant, Der Kritik der Reiner Vernunft (1781). trans. Norman Kemp Smith, Critique of 
Pure Reason, (New York, St Martins Press, 1933) pp. 165-191. 
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